


Right-wing extremism among the youth in Spain: current situation and perspectives



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**Right-wing extremism among
the youth in Spain: current
situation and perspectives**

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1

Introduction

1.1. Background

Violent right-wing extremism has resurfaced as a worrying phenomenon in Europe, with terrorism being one of its most serious and visible forms. Old and new forms of right-wing-based violence have emerged in recent years, as the Utøya attack showed in 2011. This massacre served as a wake-up call for European societies and security authorities, and highlighted the dangers of right-wing terrorism in Europe, particularly for the youth.

Furthermore, terrorism is not the sole form of extreme-right and hate-based violence. Conversely, the range of extreme-right related violence also includes hate crime and hate speech, two phenomena that should not be overlooked. The former is especially relevant considering the impact it has on minority groups, on women, but also on the general population. As for the latter, the increasing use of the Internet and social media platforms has facilitated the exponential dissemination of hate speech. While two decades ago, much more effort was required by individuals to gain access to extremist right-wing ideology, nowadays these ideas are spread at a much higher speed and to a much broader audience. This is not a trivial matter. The spread of hate speech has an important impact on minority groups, as the primary victims, but also on society as a whole, as it affects social cohesion and the quality of democratic debate.

Public authorities have undertaken a certain number of measures to counter the spread of hate crime and hate speech. On the one hand, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has prompted States to improve the reporting of such crimes, to be able to draw comparisons among countries and analyse their evolution. On the other, in regard to the prevention of hate speech, it is worth mentioning the ‘No hate speech campaign’ of the Council of Europe (CoE), implemented during the 2012-2017 period.¹ In the same vein, the European Union (EU) signed a Code of Conduct in 2015 with online platforms, in order to limit the

¹ See: Council of Europe, “No hate campaign,” accessed July 26, 2019, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/no-hate-campaign>.

dissemination of hate speech.² Nevertheless, policy actions adopted to prevent online hate speech may be controversial, as striking a balance between the respect for freedom of speech – whose limits are sometimes difficult to define – and the need to suppress hate speech, is a very difficult task.

In this context, little attention has been paid to the issue of right-wing extremism among the Spanish youth, most likely due to the so-called ‘Spanish exceptionalism’ and apparent resistance to such phenomenon, even during the economic crisis. Indeed, despite a context of harsh austerity measures, the few far-right parties in the country had failed to successfully mobilize citizens and catalyse political discourses during that period. Consequently, except for marginalized small groups, extreme right ideas had not attracted many youngsters.

However, the Spanish political landscape has recently changed. In a general context of growing misinformation, the so-called ‘fake news’, and increasing political polarization, extremist movements have gained more prominence, especially right-wing extremism. Hence, in April 2019, a far-right party, Vox, gained 24 seats in the national parliament for the first time since 1982. The absence of agreement among the political forces to form a government led to new elections in November 2019, and Vox increased its number of deputies from 24 to 52 (of a total of 350) and emerged as the third most voted party.

Yet there is a lack of evidence of the extent to which right-wing extremism is able to attract the Spanish youth. There are no recent studies analysing this phenomenon, despite the important risks derived from the emergence of right-wing extremism among the youth, both as victims of radicalization and as victims of bullying and hate crime. This is particularly relevant to youngsters from traditionally discriminated groups. There is therefore a gap in the literature regarding the attitudes of the Spanish youth towards right-wing extremism and hate speech, which needs to be addressed.

1.2. Framework of the study

This study is part of the German-funded international program “Preventing radicalization and promoting democracy through International Exchange.” Besides Spain, this international program focuses on Germany and Tunisia.

This study is also conducted under the framework of the Observatory to Prevent Extremist Violence (OPEV), which was founded in 2017 by 172 civil society organisations from the Euro-Mediterranean region, including the Human Rights Institute of Catalonia (IDHC), which was one of its promoters.

The IDHC is an NGO created in 1983 that aims to promote human rights mainly through research, training and advocacy. In 2014, the IDHC started a new line of work, focusing on preventing hate speech and hate crime. As a result of this process, the Observatory PROXI³ was created in order to monitor hate speech on digital media during the 2014-2016 period. This was followed by the establishment of the OPEV in 2016,⁴ which focuses on violent extremism.

² See: European Commission, “The EU Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online,” accessed July 26, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en.

³ See: Observatory PROXI, accessed July 26, 2019, <http://www.observatorioproxi.org/>.

⁴ See: Observatory OPEV, accessed July 26, 2019, <http://opev.org/>.

a) Objectives

This research study aims to analyse how the current changing context is affecting Spanish youngsters' attitudes and speech, and to what extent they find extreme right-wing ideas and discourses – such as hate speech – attractive. In particular, it attempts to examine whether youngsters are well equipped to resist radicalization in a context characterized by disinformation. Finally, it seeks to put forward recommendations aimed at public authorities and civil society organisations in order to prevent right-wing radicalization among youngsters. Concretely, the objectives of the study are threefold:

- Firstly, to identify possible **hotbeds** of right-wing extremism among the youth in Spain. This may include pointing at possible areas of youth interest that may work as vehicles for disseminating such ideas, particularly sports, music, the Internet and social media, as well as specific geographic or socio-economic areas that may be more vulnerable to right-wing radicalization.
- Secondly, to identify and share good practices, both among NGOs and among different levels of administration.
- Thirdly, to recommend policy actions to prevent the dissemination of intolerant attitudes and hate speech among the youth.

b) Methodology

To achieve these objectives, this report is based on three main sources of information: firstly, a **literature review** on the issue of right-wing extremism and radicalization among the youth, that encompasses both international and national academic literature; secondly, the **analysis of available data sources**, aimed at assessing the attitudes of Spanish youngsters towards diversity and at identifying relevant recent changes, if any; and thirdly, the literature review and the data analysis are complemented by a set of **12 semi-structural interviews**, that were conducted with relevant experts from January to April 2020.

This report is structured as follows: in the second section, the conceptual framework provides a definition of the main concepts used in the report; the third and fourth sections include a literature review, which explores the issue of right-wing extremism and radicalization among the youth, both in general terms (section three) and in the specific case of Spain (section four); the fifth section focuses on the values and attitudes of Spanish youngsters, both towards diversity and intolerance, as well as their ideology and voting behaviour; the sixth section presents an analysis of interviews conducted with experts in the field of right-wing extremism (a complete list is provided in Annex 1); and finally, the seventh section presents some final conclusions.

Barcelona, May 2020

Conceptual framework

2.1. Right-wing extremism, radicalization, and the use of violence

a) Right-wing extremism

Despite the extensive use of this term, there is no commonly accepted definition of '**right-wing extremism**'. Nevertheless, according to Mudde (1996), most definitions of right-wing extremism include the following five characteristics: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, the call for a strong state and anti-democratic attitude.⁵ With regards to this, it is relevant to clarify that not all five characteristics are always present, and very often they are combined with other elements, such as, for instance, the rejection of the principle of equality.⁶

For present purposes, the term 'right-wing extremism' is understood as an ideology that considers that belonging to a specific ethnic group, nation, or race determines a human being's value. This ideology is therefore opposed to human rights law, where human dignity is the central value.

'Right-wing extremism' is, thus, an umbrella term that comprises a vast array of groups that include, but are not limited to, neo-Nazism, neo-fascism, white supremacy groups, and right-wing extremist parties and their supporters. Generally speaking, this ideology targets specific groups who are blamed for the different problems in society. Consequently, the targets of these extremists encompass: left-wing, liberal or pro-diversity activists or politicians, non-white races, migrants and refugees, LGBTI people, religious or ethnic minorities such as Muslims, Jews or Roma people, feminist women, etc.

⁵ Mudde, Cas. "The war of words defining the extreme right party family." *West European Politics* 19.2 (1996): 225-248.

⁶ Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). "RAN Factbook. Far-right extremism: a practical introduction". December 2019.

b) Violent radicalization

The European Institute of Peace (EIP) defines '**radicalization**' as "a phased process in which an individual or a group embraces a radical ideology that can lead to an increased willingness to condone or use violence for political goals."⁷ It is thus important to differentiate between violent and non-violent radicalization,⁸ as the former is often understood as a process towards rejecting the *status quo*, which is not necessarily problematic if it does not involve using violence.

This research focuses on '**violent radicalization**'. For present purposes, it refers to the process by which an individual or a group embraces the use of right-wing motivated violence to achieve political goals.

c) Right-wing motivated violence

In public discourse and media, right-wing motivated violence often refers to terrorism. Nonetheless, it is not the case, as right-wing violence includes a wide range of forms of violence. To illustrate this idea, our definition of violence is based on the model of Johan Galtung,⁹ who distinguishes three different types: **direct**, **structural**, and **cultural violence**. Direct violence refers to forms of violence which are visible. Structural violence refers to forms of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. Cultural violence refers to those aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.

On this basis, right-wing violence may include forms of **direct violence**, such as violence against people or property: terrorism, hate-related violence (hate murder or other attacks), rape, arson, profanation, etc.; forms of **structural violence**, which may cover policies implemented by right-wing extremism when achieving government – for example, any kind of policies discriminating against minorities or vulnerable groups, or policies against the right to asylum and international protection –; and forms of **cultural violence**, such as hate speech, which may sometimes fall under this category, as it often justifies discrimination and violence against specific groups.

2.2. Hate speech and hate crime

a) Hate speech

The definition of right-wing extremism gives special importance to hate speech. While it is not specific to right-wing extremism, the use of hate speech is almost a *sine qua non* condition for right-wing extremism.

Hate speech is used to dehumanize minority groups, excluding them from society, limiting the capacity of showing sympathy or empathy towards other members of the in-group, and justifying inhuman treatment, from discrimination to deportation. Pursuant to the General

⁷ EIP, "EIP Explainer: Understanding radicalisation," accessed July 26, 2019, <http://www.eip.org/en/news-events/eip-explainer-understanding-radicalisation>.

⁸ Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, "The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 1 (2012): 1-21.

⁹ Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (August 1990): 291-305.

Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), hate speech may be defined as follows:

“[T]he use of one or more particular forms of expression that is based on a non-exhaustive list of personal characteristics or status that includes “race”, colour, language, religion or belief, nationality or national or ethnic origin, as well as descent, age, disability, sex, gender, gender identity and sexual orientation.”¹⁰

Hate speech includes all forms of expressions that spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance. It therefore includes expressions such as:

“The advocacy, promotion or incitement of the denigration, hatred or vilification of a person or group of persons, as well as any harassment, insult, negative stereotyping, stigmatization or threat of such person or persons and any justification of all these forms of expression.”¹¹

Hate speech has important consequences at individual and community levels. As noted in ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech, victims are “not only afraid and insecure but also – without any justification – guilty or ashamed and humiliated, leading to a loss of self-confidence and self-esteem.” In addition, it may result in “mental and physical health problems of a more serious nature”, which have in turn an impact on every aspect of the victim’s life. ECRI underlines in this respect that “their impact on family relations and the willingness to participate in society is especially serious.”¹²

b) Hate crime

Right-wing extremism may lead to hate crimes, or crimes with a racist, xenophobic, and/or anti-Semitic motivation (hate crime or ‘right-wing extremist crimes’ – RECs).¹³ The OSCE defines hate crime as “a criminal act motivated by bias or prejudice towards a particular group of people.”¹⁴ Therefore, for a hate crime to exist, two elements must concur: a criminal act (*actus reus*) and a bias motivation (*mens rea*).

Furthermore, as noted by ECRI, hate speech may become a hate crime under certain circumstances, that is “when [it] takes the form of conduct that is in itself a criminal offence – such as conduct that is abusive, harassing or insulting.”¹⁵

According to Dzelme, hate crime has effects at individual, family, and community levels.¹⁶

¹⁰ ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech, 8 December 2015, accessed July 26, 2019, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/recommendation-no.15>.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Armin Falk, Andreas Kuhn, and Josef Zweimüller, “Unemployment and Right-wing Extremist Crime,” *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 113, no. 2 (June 2011): 260–285.

¹⁴ See: OSCE, “What is hate crime,” accessed July 26, 2019, http://hatecrime.osce.org/what-hate-crime_.

¹⁵ ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech, 8 December 2015, accessed July 26, 2019, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/recommendation-no.15>.

¹⁶ At individual level, the victim invests a lot of energy into “creating some sense of individual security” as a result of fear and resents society “as a result of a perceived lack of concern from strangers, law enforcement, officials, neighbours, educators.” However, it may also have the effect of triggering activism in the improvement of their community and sensitizing victims about the suffering of others. These traits are also found at family level, but another element deserves attention: hate crime creates frustration that children born in the country remain singled out and threatened. Finally, at community level, the open resentment of the victim towards society as a whole is reflected through the internalisation of the threats, which may lead to restricted movements. As Dzelme has noted, “this restricted freedom encompasses the physical, psychological, and spiritual dimensions.” Inta Dzelme, *Psychological Effects of Hate Crime – Individual Experience and Impact on Community (Attacking Who I am)*, A qualitative study, Latvian Center for Human Rights, 2008.

3

Right-wing extremism among the youth: a literature review

3.1. Right-wing extremism: an overlooked threat

a) Background

Right-wing extremism is a serious problem in Western societies. As Falk *et al.* have shown, this ideology is deeply problematic as “(...) it questions fundamental values, such as the equality and integrity of all individuals, and because of its severe impact on victims.”¹⁷ Despite the efforts of the international community to suppress this phenomenon, its resurgence in recent years calls for urgent action.

According to some authors, the origins of right-wing extremism date back to the emergence of supremacist groups such as the KKK in the 19th century in America,¹⁸ although it is well established that the roots of contemporary right-wing extremism are to be found primarily in fascism, an ideology that was born in the ‘20s and ‘30s in Europe.¹⁹ According to historian Robert Paxton, fascism, more than an ideology, is a political phenomenon characterized by the belief in the survival of a historical group, such as the white race or a specific nation, against its enemies.²⁰ Other commonly mentioned features include, *inter alia*, the use of violence to achieve political means and the use of xenophobia and other forms of intolerance.

As right-wing extremism led to the atrocities of World War II, the international community created international organisations and institutions, most notably the United Nations, in order to suppress this scourge. At European level, the uncovering of Nazi crimes in post-war Europe prompted the establishment of regional organisations, aimed at avoiding the repetition of such events and promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In this regard, the

¹⁷ Falk *et al.*, “Unemployment and Right-wing Extremist Crime,” 260.

¹⁸ Mark Bray, *Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook* (Capitán Swing, 2017).

¹⁹ Emilio Gentile, “Fascism, totalitarianism and political religion: definitions and critical reflections on criticism of an interpretation,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 326-375.

²⁰ Robert O. Paxton, “The five stages of fascism,” *The Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 1 (1998): 1-23.

Council of Europe and the European Union (EU) have played an important role in establishing and consolidating these values throughout the continent.

While it had never completely disappeared, right-wing extremism has resurfaced globally since the 2008 financial and economic crisis. In most European democracies, far-right parties emerged in a modernized form in the 1980s, due to both their own renewal and to the changing environment during that decade.²¹ This movement was then accelerated because of the 2008 crisis, adopting sometimes violent and extremely radical forms, with the rapid rise of ‘Golden Dawn’ being a relevant case in point during those years.²²

Nowadays, right-wing extremism has become a “significant threat to communities in Europe” according to Kallis *et al.*²³ Extremist parties have gained more prominence at local, national, but also European levels, as the 2019 European Parliament’s elections have shown,²⁴ thereby proposing a new and dangerous alternative for Europe.

In addition, the different movements falling under the umbrella of right-wing extremism do not necessarily form a homogeneous category,²⁵ thus making it more difficult to identify a potential profile. In fact, significant differences exist among them: on the one hand, there are **radical right** parties such as the Danish People’s Party, the UK Independence Party, the True Finns, or the French National Rally, which accept democracy; and on the other hand, there are **more extremist** parties that often reject democracy and openly defend direct violence, such as Golden Dawn in Greece or Jobbik in Hungary, albeit more recently the latter has slightly moderated its discourse.

That being said, they do all share one characteristic: the **rejection of diversity and the use of hate speech**. As expressed by Bharath Ganesh (2019), while these two movements cannot be equated, there are deep synergies between them, as “both are grounded in a white identity politics that centres on a racist and sexist backlash against equality, diversity and gender justice”, and both “are committed to the restoration of racial and gender hierarchies that have been challenged in the last six decades”.²⁶ Moreover, recent studies on right-wing radicalization in Europe demonstrate that nowadays this ideology is characterized by being hyper individual²⁷, meaning that it is not that common for individuals to identify strongly with a particular group, as it was in the past. Conversely, now it is more common for supporters of right-wing extremism to shop from one group to another – often changing from more to less extremist organisations – and to attend events organised by different kind of groups within that ideology.

Moreover, according to Daniel Kölher, during recent years there has been growing international collaboration among extreme right groups, who share narratives and strategic concepts, such as, for example, the Great Replacement conspiracy theory, which has become a standard reference since the New Zealand terror attack in 2019.²⁸

In light of these elements, it is necessary to take into consideration the impact of these movements on **democracy**, even when right-wing extremists do not yield power. In this

²¹ Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafi, *Right-wing extremism in Europe: country analyses, counter-strategies and labor-market oriented exit strategies* (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2013), 17.

²² *Ibid.*, 77.

²³ Aristotle Kallis, Sara Zeiger, and Bilgehan Öztürk (eds), *Violent radicalization & Far-right Extremism in Europe* (SETA Publications, 2018), 14.

²⁴ See: European Parliament, “Results of the 2019 European elections,” updated July 2, 2019, accessed July 26, 2019, <https://election-results.eu/>.

²⁵ See: “Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide,” BBC, May 24, 2019, accessed July 26, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006>.

²⁶ See, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/advisory-network-terrorism-and-propaganda-workshop-%E2%80%9Cdefining-global-right-wing-extremist-movement%E2%80%9D>.

²⁷ RAN Factbook, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

²⁸ See, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/advisory-network-terrorism-and-propaganda-workshop-%E2%80%9Cdefining-global-right-wing-extremist-movement%E2%80%9D>.

respect, tougher immigration policies have become a priority in the political landscape in Western Europe, sometimes even among leftist parties.²⁹ Right-wing extremism has come to play a catalyst role in European politics and most mainstream parties have adopted their discourse and brought their agendas closer to the right.³⁰ Finally, because it creates an "us versus them" climate, right-wing populism may be considered a contributing factor for right-wing terrorism.³¹

In that regard, violent right-wing extremism is posing an actual threat to national security. The Utøya attacks in 2011 in Norway served as a wake-up call in this sense and highlighted the dangers of right-wing terrorism in Europe. Since then, security services across Europe have had "to revisit their assessment of the overall severity of the threat posed by extreme-right lone actors and to devote extra resources to the phenomenon."³²

Since then, it seems that right-wing terrorism incidents are increasing both worldwide and in Europe, particularly since 2015. An analysis shows that in the period 1990-2015, the number of deadly incidents derived from right-wing extremism declined considerably in Western Europe.³³ However, this trend may be changing, as, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2019 report, incidents of far-right terrorism have been increasing globally, including in Western Europe.³⁴ More concretely, this report states that the total number of incidents has increased by 320% over the previous five years.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to assess the evolution of right-wing terrorism in Europe and worldwide, as figures may differ between organisations, probably due to the different methodologies used, as well as to terrorism being a highly contested term with deep political implications. For instance, a Europol report disputes the increase of incidents in Europe, stating that "five foiled, failed or completed terrorist attacks attributed to right-wing extremists were reported for 2017", all of them in the UK.³⁵

In any case, it is important to stress that there are other serious types of right-wing motivated violence besides attacks classified as terrorism, such as hate murder, physical attacks, arson, etc. According to Europol figures, such offences almost doubled in 2017.³⁶ Moreover, in line with the recent RAN Factbook, even a small presence of far-right extremists does affect society in many ways, as "coordinated attacks, even sometimes just online and/or verbal, may lead to self-censorship within the public debate" and, "It could also lead to attacks on minorities and refugees on a local level".³⁷

Thus, the preoccupation with right-wing extremism should not be limited to terrorism prevention, as the consequences of the dissemination of this ideology go well beyond the realm of security, as already mentioned, affecting social cohesion and the very idea of inclusive society.

²⁹ See, for example, the Danish case: Haugbolle, Sune. "Did the Left Really Win in Denmark?" *Foreign Policy* June 7, 2019, accessed July 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/07/did-the-left-really-win-in-denmark-mette-frederiksen-social-democrats-danish-peoples-party-venstre-immigration-asylum/>.

³⁰ Yilmaz, Ferruh. "Right-wing hegemony and immigration: how the populist far-right achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe." *Current Sociology* 60, no. 3 (2012): 368-381.

³¹ Greven, Thomas. *The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective*. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2016, 9.

³² Koehler, Daniel. "Right-Wing Extremist Radicalization Processes: The Formers' Perspective." *JEX Journal EXIT-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur* 1 (2014), 15.

³³ Aasland Ravndal, Jacob. "Right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV dataset." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 3 (2016): 2-15.

³⁴ Institute for Economics and Peace. "Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism", 2020. Accessed May 2020: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018.pdf>.

³⁵ European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL). "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018", 2018: 51.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ RAN Factbook, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

b) Right-wing extremism among the youth

Studies show that right-wing extremism is an ideology which is attractive to young people, particularly young men. Regarding support for right-wing extremism among the youth, research has suggested that European youngsters – together with the elderly – are more likely to approach right-wing extremism.³⁸ In fact, when attempting to draw a potential profile of a far-right supporter in Europe, Kallis *et al.* highlight that right-wing extremism is particularly popular among the youth, especially “**young, white males.**”³⁹

The view that young men are more attracted to this ideology is also reflected in the fact that they are more present in right-wing extremist groups (particularly in skinhead organisations, as will be explained later). However, recent studies on right-wing radicalization may indicate that the role of women in these groups may have been underestimated, as there are more and more women who are leaders of these movements.⁴⁰

In any case, aside from age and sex, other contextual and individual factors are relevant in prompting support for right-wing extremism. On the one hand, **contextual factors** should be considered. Generally speaking, support for right-wing extremism is facilitated by “rising levels of immigration and public dissatisfaction with the political regime.”⁴¹ More concretely, it is particularly important to look at the national political culture and local contexts – “that influence symbology and narratives” – as they are also important in determining a potential profile.

On the other hand, according to a comparative analysis on the support for far-right ideology among the youth in 15 European countries by Mieriņa and Koroleva (2015), apart from contextual factors, **individual factors**, such as support for ethnic nationalism, financial problems, economic insecurity, and low interest and poor understanding of politics, are also key. These factors “are associated with a higher propensity to support far-right ideology and, thus, getting involved in far-right movements”.⁴² As a result, it is relevant to monitor the evolution of youngsters’ attitudes towards diversity, their ideological inclinations and their interest and consideration of politics and democracy.

In the next section, we delve into more details regarding the reasons that may explain violent right-wing radicalization among the youth. In other words, we try to disentangle the factors that may lead a young person to resort to violence or to justifying its use to achieve political goals.

3.2. Right-wing radicalization among the youth: key explanations

As a preliminary observation, it should be noted that right-wing radicalization processes have been underestimated in the literature. As a result of the 9/11 attacks and similar terrorist attacks in Europe which were conducted by cells linked to organisations such as Al-Qaida and Daesh, most of the recent academic literature has focused on other kinds of radicalization

³⁸ Inta Mieriņa and Ilze Koroleva, “Support for far-right ideology and anti-migrant attitudes among youth in Europe: A comparative analysis,” *The Sociological Review* 63 (2015): 184.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ RAN Factbook, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁴¹ Pia Knigge. “The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe,” *European Journal of Political Research* 34, no. 2 (2003): 249-279.

⁴² *Ibid.*

processes, thus overlooking the threat of right-wing radicalization.⁴³ Therefore, there are very few empirical studies which focus particularly on this kind of radicalization.⁴⁴

There is, however, an abundance of literature that focuses on violent radicalization processes, which may be useful to understand the different steps and phases that young people go through. According to Bartlett & Miller (2012), who conducted a general study about violent radicalization processes, these take place due to the following factors:⁴⁵

- 1) An **emotional pull**: This pull is based on an ‘us versus them’ narrative, that leads the individual to act in response to perceived injustice against the group to which he or she belongs.
- 2) A **sense of thrill, excitement and coolness in carrying out the act**: it drives the individual to use violence as a means, often under the influence of materials produced by extremists.
- 3) A feeling of **status and adherence to an internal code of honour**.
- 4) **Peer pressure**: it strengthens the individual’s extremist beliefs and pushes them into violent actions.

Schils and Verhage further identify the following risk factors:⁴⁶

- 1) Elements that form the **breeding ground**: these include the global context – “structural, political, social, and economic processes” that go beyond the scope of individuals – and local circumstances, such as unemployment.
- 2) **Individual push factors (propensity)**: these refer to certain personality traits and emotions (such as frustration, hate, etc.) that make certain people more likely to adopt a certain behaviour.
- 3) **Environmental pull factors (exposure)**: these refer to the attractiveness of violent extremism in addressing certain fundamental issues, ideological recognition, and the connection to extremism through friends or family.

Against this background, and in an attempt to simplify this complex and abundant literature, we present some risk factors of right-wing radicalization among the youth which are relevant for present purposes: education and socialization, subcultures, economic factors, the media environment, and social media and the Internet.

a) Education and socialization

Education and socialization are understood as having an influence on radicalization processes, as Pels and Ruyter have shown. On the one hand, research among adolescents points to a concordance in racism between parents and their teenagers, thereby illustrating the intergenerational transmission of ideology. Furthermore, Pels and Ruyter highlight that

⁴³ Macklin, Graham. “The Evolution of Extreme-Right Terrorism and Efforts to Counter It in the United Kingdom.” *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, 12, no. 1 (January 2019), accessed July 2019, <https://ctc.usma.edu/evolution-extreme-right-terrorism-efforts-counter-united-kingdom/>.

⁴⁴ An exception is the recent work of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) of the EU, particularly the report “Far-right extremism: a practical introduction”, published in December 2019. More info, here: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation Awareness_network_en.

⁴⁵ Bartlett, Jamie and Miller, Carl. “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 1 (2012): 1-21.

⁴⁶ Nele Schils and Antoinette Verhage, “Understanding How and Why Young People Enter Radical or Violent Extremist Groups,” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 11, no. 2 (2017): 1-17.

authoritarian parenting may play a significant role in right-wing radicalization, thus referring to the parenting style rather than the values transmitted to younger generations.⁴⁷

On the other hand, this idea may be challenged, as Shils and Verhage (2017) report cases of youngsters with parents with racist views that challenge them, after positive encounters with people from different races. This would be an example of the **contact theory** at work, whereby prejudice between majority and minority groups can be reduced as a result of intergroup contact.

That being said, the positive impact of intergroup contact arguably varies from one context to another; in this regard, Pels and Ruyter argue that this hypothesis works in positive contexts only, "for instance if groups are equal in their position on the status hierarchy."⁴⁸

b) Subcultures

In the field of criminology, subcultural theories purport that some specific groups, or subcultures, are more prone to crime and violence due to the values and attitudes promoted among them. This theory has been applied to right-wing radicalization by Pisoiu.⁴⁹ It is therefore important to identify the specific subcultures of right-wing extremism.

The **neo-Nazi skinhead** is an important subculture of right-wing extremism. The skinhead subculture was born in the UK in the 1960s among working class youths; it then spread across the globe in the 1980s. While it was not necessarily associated to any political movement at the beginning, skinheads became more politically active starting from the 1970s and have tended to be associated with right-wing extremism. Among the important neo-Nazi skinhead groups, it is possible to mention White Aryan Resistance, Blood and Honour, and Hammerskins.

Another feature of skinhead culture is the specific role of masculinity. As Miller-Idriss has shown, **masculinity** has always been important in the far-right scene, traditionally through a skinhead style. However, if style has shifted away from the skinhead appearance, masculinity, "and its idealized notions of manhood and of what a 'real man' does for the nation", remain key elements of right-wing extremism.⁵⁰ In a similar vein, Pollard argues that, in fact, women only rarely attend skinhead events.⁵¹

Skinheads use **music and street violence** to express their racism. In this context, merchandising has been an important source of revenue of this subculture. White power music also plays an important role in spreading neo-Nazi skinhead ideals, recruiting, and generating revenue. According to the Australian Human Rights Commission, "through the Internet, this music has become perhaps the most important tool of the international neo-Nazi movement to gain revenue and new recruits."⁵² In this sense, some extremist groups have articulated music as a means of recruitment, with concerts being the forum where recruitment actually takes place.⁵³

In the case of Spain, the most recent RAXEN report (2019), elaborated yearly by the *Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia*, estimates that there are more than 10,000 people with neo-

⁴⁷ Pels, Trees and de Ruyter, Doret J. "The Influence of Education and Socialization on Radicalization: An Exploration of Theoretical Presumptions and Empirical Research." *Child Youth Care Forum* 41 (2012): 311-325.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 319.

⁴⁹ Pisoiu, Daniela. "Subcultural Theory Applied to Jihadi and Right-Wing Radicalization in Germany." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 27, no. 1 (2015): 9-28.

⁵⁰ Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. "Soldier, sailor, rebel, rule-breaker: masculinity and the body in the German far right." *Gender and Education* 29, no. 2 (2017): 199-215.

⁵¹ Pollard, John. "Skinhead culture: the ideologies, mythologies, religions and conspiracy theories of racist skinheads." *Patterns of Prejudice* 50, no. 4-5 (2016): 407.

⁵² Australian Human Rights Commission. "Examples of racist material on the Internet." Accessed July 26, 2019. <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/examples-racist-material-internet>.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Nazi ideology in Spain.⁵⁴ It further states that there are racist and xenophobic groups in all Spanish regions.

There is an important connection between right-wing extremism and **football hooliganism**. The latter "includes any form of confrontation between opposing fans which can occur in a variety of ways before, during, or after the match either at the stadium or elsewhere."⁵⁵ This subculture normally consists of young males, who share ties to a football team and believe in hooliganism as a way of life.⁵⁶ As Garland and Treadwell have shown, a recent example of the connection between football hooliganism and right-wing extremism is embodied in the English Defence League, that has managed to organise a series of protest marches against Islam and recruited supporters among football fans.⁵⁷

In the case of Spain, authors such as Ramón Llopis-Goig have repeatedly warned of the significant presence of racism, xenophobia and intolerance in Spanish football.⁵⁸ Similarly, according to the *Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia*, "ultra-groups in football stadiums are the most important form of recruitment of youngsters by hate groups."⁵⁹

Finally, the identification of these subcultures is also important in order to identify the risk that they go mainstream. Cynthia Miller-Idriss has indeed argued that high-quality mainstream clothing and products have become vectors of racist, xenophobic, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic and nationalist ideas, thereby contributing to the normalization and generalization of such ideas and the radicalization of the youth.⁶⁰

c) Socio-economic factors

Socio-economic factors are also thought to be a driving force behind right-wing extremism. Indeed, several studies have pointed out a correlation between **unemployment** and right-wing extremism. This is the case for instance of Fischer and Modigliano, who underlined back in 1978 the prominent belief among historians that "high unemployment rates facilitated the rise of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s." According to this perspective, unemployment, but also the threat of becoming unemployed, leads to a loss of status and feelings of deprivation, which in turn fuels right-wing extremism.⁶¹

This idea has been further restated, for example by Falk *et al.* in 2011; they note that as unemployment rates increase, so does right-wing extremist crime.⁶² In this respect, the significantly higher rates of unemployment in eastern German states are presented as a possible explanation for the important differences in the prevalence of right-wing extremist crime between eastern and western German states.

This factor is therefore especially relevant for the youth:

⁵⁴ Movimiento contra la Intolerancia. *Informe RAXEN. Especial 2018. La Mundialización de la Intolerancia normaliza el Odio Identitario*. Madrid: 2019. 2019, accessed July 2019, http://www.mitramiss.gob.es/oberaxe/es/publicaciones/documentos/documento_0116.htm.

⁵⁵ Grinnell College. "Subcultures and Sociology. Football hooligans." Accessed July 26, 2019. <https://haenfler.sites.grinnell.edu/subcultures-and-scenes/football-hooligans/>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Garland, Jon and Treadwell, James. "'No surrender to the Taliban!': Football hooliganism, Islamophobia and the rise of the English Defence League." *Papers from the British Criminology Conference* 10 (2010): 19-35.

⁵⁸ Llopis-Goig, Ramon. "Racism, xenophobia and intolerance in Spanish football: evolution and responses from the government and the civil society." *Soccer & Society* 14, no. 2 (2013): 262-276.

⁵⁹ Movimiento contra la Intolerancia. *Materiales didácticos nº6. Contra el racismo y la intolerancia en el fútbol. Recomendaciones internacionales y legislación*, accessed July 2019, http://www.mitramiss.gob.es/oberaxe/ficheros/documentos/MaterialesDidacticos6_ContraRacismoIntoleranciaFutbol.pdf.

⁶⁰ Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. "The Extreme Gone Mainstream: Commercialization and Far Right Youth Culture in Germany." *Princeton University Press*, 2018.

⁶¹ Falk *et al.*, "Unemployment and Right-wing Extremist Crime," 260-285.

⁶² *Ibid.*

"Young people are typically among those that suffer the effects of socioeconomic transformations the most and their insecure situation in the labour market facilitates support for far-right parties".⁶³

This is even more important in Spain, as the youth has been hit hard by unemployment; more than 50% of people under 25 were unemployed in 2014.⁶⁴

However, regarding the impact of economic factors, while most researchers agree on the role of the economic crisis and its consequences in promoting right-wing extremism, Kallis *et al.* highlight that the issue of **identity** should not be overlooked. Indeed, "questions around a sense of identity are at the core of far-right radicalization in Europe."⁶⁵ According to this report, extremists capitalize on this identity question, (how being 'Hungarian' or 'British' or 'French' or 'German' is interpreted), "by claiming to have the correct and most 'pure' interpretation of it, and justifying acts of violence or hate speech against anyone not fitting within that interpretation", for instance migrants.⁶⁶

This idea is reinforced by the recent Spanish and Portuguese experiences: although both countries have suffered important consequences from the economic crisis and citizens have experienced harsh austerity measures, they had not witnessed the resurgence of right-wing extremism during that time. Quite the contrary, in the case of Spain, the attitudes towards immigrants and foreign nationals actually improved during the economic crisis.⁶⁷

Therefore, in the case of Spain, the possible impact that economic factors, such as unemployment, may have on right-wing radicalization of youngsters should be clarified *vis-à-vis* other factors based on identity, particularly how issues such as migration may be interpreted as a threat to national-based identities.

d) Media environment

Another important risk factor is the media environment. The media play a crucial role in shaping public debate and are an essential aspect in the good functioning of a democratic system. Moreover, in democratic societies, freedom of speech is a fundamental right that entails political pluralism and the freedom of the press. This also means that the media play a crucial role in deciding to give exposure or not to right-wing extremism.

In this respect, the link between a polarized public debate around issues such as migration on the one hand, and radicalization on the other, is currently in discussion. According to Kallis *et al.*, sometimes the mainstream political discussions in the media around issues such as migration, can reinforce ideologies of the far-right, as they may strengthen the view of migration as a threat to national identities.⁶⁸ Moreover, following the Christchurch mosque attack which occurred in New Zealand in 2019, experts have criticised the fact that mainstream parties and media commentators sometimes resort to the same rhetoric as right-wing extremists, as they promote "a toxic political environment that allows hate to flourish."⁶⁹

⁶³ Inta Mierina and Ilze Koroleva, "Support for far-right ideology," 183-205.

⁶⁴ See: World Bank. "Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate)." Accessed July 26, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ES>.

⁶⁵ Kallis *et al.*, *Violent radicalization*, p. 15.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁷ Mercedes Fernández, Consuelo Valbuena, and Raquel Caro, *Study on the Evolution of racism, xenophobia and other related forms of intolerance in Spain* (OBERAXE, 2017).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁹ Greg Barton, "Christchurch attacks are a stark warning of toxic political environment that allows hate to flourish," *The Conversation*, March 16, 2019, accessed July 2019, <https://theconversation.com/christchurch-attacks-are-a-stark-warning-of-toxic-political-environment-that-allows-hate-to-flourish-113662>.

Europe is no exception in this regard. The so-called refugee crisis and the Brexit process, to mention two cases in point, have triggered a toxic political debate, affecting political parties and the media alike, which has normalized hate speech to some extent. In fact, it is no coincidence that people participating in the political debate have been targeted by extremists. According to Europol (2019), politicians, public figures, political parties, civic action groups and media that take a critical view of right-wing extremism, or advocate pro-migration policies, are considered to be potential targets of right-wing extremists.⁷⁰ The recent assassinations of pro-migration politicians in the UK (Jo Cox in 2016) and in Germany (Walter Lübcke in 2019) illustrate this idea.

In a similar vein, and in relation to young people, Mierija and Korojeva have shown that, contrary to expectations, when young people watch different media channels more frequently, there is an increase in xenophobia, exclusionism and negative attitudes towards all kinds of minorities, leading to the conclusion that “the media are at least partly responsible for the recent spread of populism and far right sentiments across Europe.”⁷¹

e) Social media and the Internet

Social media and the Internet are perhaps the space where right-wing extremism is most visible. The widespread use of social media platforms and the Internet has led to the exponential dissemination of information throughout the world, including extremist ideologies. As extremist groups have the same advantages as the general population in terms of information and networking,⁷² the impact of social media on radicalization, terrorist acts, and other ideologically motivated violence is under scrutiny.

According to Thompson, the Internet has been used successfully by terrorists in order to recruit and radicalise members for their cause.⁷³ As Schils and Verhage have shown, extremist groups use the Internet in the same manner as other social and political movements; they identify three types of activities that are of special relevance for radicalization: the spreading of propaganda and ideological frameworks, networking and practical organisation, and community building.⁷⁴

Social media platforms have indeed become one of the main means of disseminating extremist ideas and hate speech. A rather intuitive consequence is that social media platforms are used to promote ideologies that challenge the democratic system itself at an unprecedented speed, due to the multiplier effect of such platforms. In many cases, social media have turned into primary sources of information. As such, they are particularly relevant for disseminating propaganda and organising and establishing networks and groups; in fact, social media platforms have also been used to share footage promoting terrorist acts.⁷⁵

In addition to this, the algorithms used on these platforms often confirm existing bias, insofar as they are developed so as to present the user with contents that (s)he will like,

⁷⁰ See, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/crime-areas/terrorism>.

⁷¹ Inta Mierija and Ilze Korojeva, “Support for far-right ideology,” 198.

⁷² Nele Schils and Antoinette Verhage, “Understanding How and Why,” 5.

⁷³ Robin L. Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2012): 167-190.

⁷⁴ Nele Schils and Antoinette Verhage, “Understanding How and Why,” 5.

⁷⁵ For example, the perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shootings recorded a video of the attacks that was extensively shared on social media.

contents that will indeed reinforce the user's bias. Such a mechanism therefore leads to the so-called 'echo chamber', which may result in increased polarization and extremism.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, the role played by social media and the Internet in radicalization processes is also questioned, and it is unclear whether the use of social media and the Internet by right-wing extremist groups has indeed led to an increase in radicalization. In this regard, Schils and Verhage underline the relevance of offline interpersonal contact, and the idea that the Internet, while not acting as a substitute for it, rather supports offline radicalization processes already taking place.⁷⁷

These findings demonstrate that there is a need to establish efficient public-private partnerships in the identification and monitoring of right-wing radicalized groups online. As Kallis *et al.* have underlined, private sector companies hold an important responsibility in tackling the spread of violent right-wing extremism.⁷⁸ In this sense, they recommend to use "the online presence of these movements to identify the ideology and networks, and designing interventions that work offline to counter those messages received in the online space."⁷⁹ They underline that internal policies for both hate speech and terrorism should be reassessed on a constant basis, also to ensure that not only religion-based extremism is identified, but also far-right and far-left violent extremism.⁸⁰

The platforms may actually play a significant role in preventing the spread of right-wing extremist-based direct violence. Matthew *et al.* (2020), from Cardiff University's HateLab, have established a link between hate speech targeting race and religion on Twitter, and racially and religiously aggravated offences that happen offline.⁸¹ Consequently, similar algorithms may be used by police to predict spikes of hate crime and stop them from happening by allocating more resources at specific periods, for instance increasing police presence in vulnerable places such as mosques or synagogues.

⁷⁶ Pablo Barberá, *et al.* "Tweeting from left to right: Is online political communication more than an echo chamber?" *Psychological science* 26, no. 10 (2015): 1531-1542.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Kallis *et al.*, *Violent radicalization*, 17.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Williams, Matthew L., *et al.* "Hate in the Machine: Anti-Black and Anti-Muslim Social Media Posts as Predictors of Offline Racially and Religiously Aggravated Crime." *The British Journal of Criminology* 60, no. 1 (2020): 93-117.

4

Right-wing radicalization among the youth in Spain: a gap

4.1. Background

a) An unresolved legacy

Right-wing extremism has a long tradition in Spain: it is one of the few Western European democracies that was not built or rebuilt in the 20th century on the defeat of fascism at the end of World War II. Furthermore, the Spanish transition from a dictatorial regime into a liberal democracy in the absence of revolution or civil war, entails significant 'anomalies' for a western democracy, which have not been entirely resolved 40 years after the fall of the Francoist regime.

In an attempt to deal with the legacies of the Civil War and dictatorship, the Spanish Parliament adopted in 2007 a Historical Memory Law,⁸² which, *inter alia*, condemns the Franco regime, recognizes the victims of the Civil War, gives rights to the victims of the Civil War and Francoist repression and their descendants, and attempts to remove Francoist symbols from public spaces.

Despite the efforts made on the basis of this law, there is still a significant presence of monuments that glorify the Francoist regime and there are streets named after important figures of the regime. The most visible sign is the Valley of the Fallen (*Valle de los Caídos*), a Francoist regime monument and, until October 2019, the burial site of Francisco Franco.

More importantly, the crimes committed during the dictatorship have fallen into oblivion and impunity has prevailed. There are approximately 114,000 disappeared persons in Spain, for whom the State has not taken responsibility in spite of reiterated UN recommendations to fulfil its international obligations regarding missing persons.⁸³

⁸² Law 57/2007 that recognizes and broadens the rights and establishes measures in favour of those who suffered persecution or violence during the Civil War and the Dictatorship.

⁸³ Pablo De Grieff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence, General Assembly of the United Nations, Mission to Spain, A/HRC/27/56/Add.1, accessed July 2019, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/090/52/PDF/G1409052.pdf?OpenElement>.

This situation is largely unknown by Spanish youngsters, as the education curriculum does not sufficiently cover, also from a human rights perspective, the study of the crimes committed during Franco's dictatorship. In this context, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, noted during his mission to Spain in 2014 that, although the school curriculum has come to include some references to Franco regime's repression in recent years, "[s]ome textbooks, however, still referred to those data in general terms, perpetuating the idea of symmetrical responsibility."⁸⁴ He therefore concluded that the study of the Civil War and subsequent Francoist dictatorship should be associated with programs for human rights training and the promotion of human rights.⁸⁵

b) Spain's exceptionalism

Despite this unresolved and problematic heritage, until 2018 no far-right political party or movement was able to obtain parliamentary representation or significant influence in the political landscape since the transition. Concretely, extreme right-wing parties have represented around 1% of the vote since the first democratic elections; conversely, the Popular Party, the most important conservative party, has been able to bring together the whole spectrum of the right until very recently.

Surprisingly, and in contrast to other European countries, this situation did not change, neither in response to the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and in Barcelona and Cambrils (2016), nor as a result of the economic crisis. As mentioned above, the latter has had important consequences in Spain, as the financial crisis led to the debt crisis and triggered the implementation of harsh austerity measures. Spain was therefore one of the most affected countries in the EU: unemployment rates increased dramatically, peaking at almost 27% for the whole active population in 2013⁸⁶ and more than 50% for the youth in 2014.⁸⁷ Another long-term consequence is that poverty has increased, making Spain the second country in the EU with the highest rate of child poverty (28.3%).⁸⁸

Despite this context, in general the existing political parties did not resort to anti-migration rhetoric,⁸⁹ and no extreme right-wing party succeeded in capitalizing on this situation. In fact, as mentioned above, the attitudes of Spaniards towards immigrants and foreign nationals even improved during the economic crisis.⁹⁰ According to a 2017 study on the 'Evolution of racism, xenophobia and other related forms of intolerance in Spain' prepared by the Spanish Ministry of Employment and OBERAXE:

"[I]t is worth highlighting the peaceful acceptance of the negative consequences of the recession, the persistence of social harmony, the low number of racist or xenophobic incidents, and the low level of politicization of the migration issue during the period."⁹¹

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ See: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), accessed July 2019, <http://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Datos.htm?t=4247>.

⁸⁷ See: World Bank. "Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate)," accessed July 26, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ES>.

⁸⁸ María Sosa Troya, "Atrapados en la pobreza," *El País*, April 22, 2019, accessed July 2019, https://elpais.com/politica/2019/04/21/actualidad/1555866966_016768.html.

⁸⁹ There are, however, some notorious exceptions, as the case of the Popular Party mayor Xavier García Albiol, who was prosecuted for making xenophobic remarks during the 2010 municipal elections in Badalona (Catalonia). "Badalona mayor faces trial on race-hate rap," *El País*, 12 April 2013, accessed May 2020, https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2013/04/12/inenglish/1365795341_087401.html.

⁹⁰ Mercedes Fernández, Consuelo Valbuena, and Raquel Caro, *Study on the Evolution of racism, xenophobia and other related forms of intolerance in Spain* (OBERAXE, 2017).

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

From 2008 to 2015, concern for immigration and manifest hostility towards immigrants had indeed decreased, in contrast with other European countries hit by the crisis. For example, when asked about not sanctioning racist or xenophobic opinions and insults, only 5% agreed in 2015 as opposed to 22% in 2008.⁹² Scholars have tried to explain this ‘exceptionalism’.⁹³

Regarding the absence of anti-migration discourse, Rinken proposes different hypotheses,⁹⁴ including the existence of a post-1978 political culture that disapproves of intolerance and fosters the universality of human rights. Jeannette Neumann also recalls that the Francoist regime was ultranationalist, so the Spanish population has become opposed to any truly nationalist parties.⁹⁵ This is particularly relevant as the dictatorship ended relatively recently and many living Spaniards lived through it. This culture also entails the weakening of the distinction between illegal and legal immigration and has a negative perception of the political class, therefore rejecting anti-immigration discourse by politicians.

Secondly, the general population is aware that the crisis has had an even greater impact on immigrants, as it has activated return and re-emigration processes, thereby diminishing the relevance of scapegoating mechanisms.⁹⁶

As for the absence of a strong extreme right-wing party, Lebourg has underlined the specificities of the Spanish extreme right, since it has been historically fragmented and characterized by “powerful heteronomy compared with its European counterparts, especially in France and Italy.”⁹⁷

Likewise, Alonso and Rovira consider that despite an actual demand for such political parties, three factors impede their electoral success and consolidation from the supply side: “the cleavage structure of the country, the strategy of competition of the mainstream right and the electoral system.”⁹⁸ Regarding the former factor, Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou argue that the success of an extreme right-wing party in times of economic crisis does not depend on political opportunities only, “but also on cultural opportunities, particularly nationalism.”⁹⁹ Consequently, the potential for right-wing extremism is greater in times of crisis if there is “no identity cleavage and nationalism is concentrated.”¹⁰⁰ Therefore, it seems that the presence of various identity cleavages in Spain may have been an obstructing factor for the formation of such a party, even during the favourable setting of an economic crisis.

4.2. The end of Spain’s exceptionalism

The Andalusian elections in December 2018 put an end to Spain’s exceptionalism: the extremist party Vox achieved parliamentary representation for the first time. The party was created in December 2013, mainly by former members of the Popular Party who were disappointed with

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Sometimes characterized as ‘Iberian exceptionalism’ as it would also include Portugal.

⁹⁴ Sebastian Rinken, “Actitudes hacia la inmigración y los inmigrantes: ¿En qué es España excepcional?” *Migraciones* 37 (2015): 53-74.

⁹⁵ See Jeannette Neumann: “Si se quiere prevenir que un partido de ultraderecha gane apoyo en España, hay que tomar medidas.” *Radiocable*, September 25, 2018, accessed July 2019, <http://www.radiocable.com/jeannette-neumann-ultraderecha-esp427.html>

⁹⁶ Sebastian Rinken, “¿En qué es España excepcional?” 53-74.

⁹⁷ Nicolas Lebourg, “Arriba Eurasia? The Difficult Establishment of Neo-Eurasianism in Spain.” In *Eurasianism and European far right: reshaping the Europe-Russia relationship*, 2015, accessed July 2019, <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01696047/document>.

⁹⁸ Sonia Alonso and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Spain: No country for the populist radical right?” *South European Society and Politics* 20, no. 1 (2015): 21-45.

⁹⁹ Daphne Halikiopoulou and Sofia Vasilopoulou, “Breaching the social contract: crises of democratic representation and patterns of extreme right party support”, *Government and Opposition*, 2018, 53(1), 26-50.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

its leader at the time: Mariano Rajoy. The latter was considered too moderate, especially regarding his response to the Catalan pro-independence movement.

In the last two years, Vox has disrupted Spain's political landscape. In December 2018, Vox gained 12 seats in the regional parliament, equalling 396,607 votes (11% of the electorate), thus making it the fifth party in terms of votes. Furthermore, the party was instrumental in the formation of the regional government, composed of a right-wing coalition made of the Popular Party (the traditional right-wing party) and *Ciudadanos* (Citizens, a new centre-right party), as it gave external support to the coalition.

The party has further consolidated its electoral basis. As mentioned above, it won 24 seats (out of 350) of the Congress, the most important chamber of the Spanish Parliament, in the 2019 national elections. The votes thus amounted to 2,677,173 votes (10.3% of the electorate), making Vox the fifth party at national level in terms of votes.

Vox then obtained 1,331,366 votes in the European Elections, held on 26 May 2019, which coincided with the municipal and regional elections in some regions. In the European elections, the regions where this party is most represented are the following: **Andalusia** with 11%, the **Valencian Community** with 10.6%, **Murcia** with 9.46%, **Madrid** with 8.9%, and **Castilla-La Mancha** with 7.02%. In sum, the party shifted from 47,182 votes in the 2016 general elections to more than two and a half million votes in 2019. Moreover, the results of the **regional and municipal elections** made this party key to the formation of relevant regional and municipal governments, most notably Madrid.

More importantly, this party was able to improve its position considerably in the November 2019 general elections. As mentioned above, Vox obtained 3,656,979 votes, a 15% share of the vote, being the third most voted party, and obtaining 52 seats in the national parliament.

Although it is still too early to shed light onto this significant increase in such a short timeframe, some factors may be put forward. According to a recent analysis of the PorCausa Foundation on 'La Franquicia Antimigración', the success of Vox is due to a combination of factors that are the result of a decade of social and economic crisis and endemic corruption, among others.¹⁰¹ They also point to the capacity of this party of reviving the dormant but robust tradition of the 'Spanish reactionary ultra-nationalism' in light of a new enemy: the Catalan pro-independence movement. Furthermore, this party successfully took advantage of the international winds of political change, since almost all European countries (so far, with the only exceptions being Luxemburg, Malta and Ireland) have an extreme right-wing party with political representation.

a) Right-wing extremism in Spain nowadays

At present, despite the existence of other smaller groups, Vox represents the practical totality of the Spanish extreme right.¹⁰² Its ideology comprises, *inter alia*, the following aspects:¹⁰³

- **Ultra-nationalism:** Following the model of Trump in the USA and Salvini in Italy, the *leitmotiv* of this party is 'Spain first'. Furthermore, the Catalan pro-independence movement has triggered an important reaction from this party, which proposes Spanish nationalism as the alternative. In this context, it advocates the end of the regionalised State, thus

¹⁰¹ Pedro Fernández de Castro and Ana González-Páramo (coord.), *Study on 'La Franquicia Antimigración'* (PorCausa Foundation, 2019), 40, accessed July 26, 2019, <https://porcausa.org/articulo/la-franquicia-antimigracion/>.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 46-48.

removing regional autonomy and self-government. Another manifestation of this aspect is the willingness to repeal the Law of Historical Memory.

- **Anti-multiculturalism:** Vox vehemently rejects cultural and religious diversity. It defends “Spanish and Christian cultural values”, believing that cultural homogeneity is for the greater good. It also proposes the construction of a wall at the southern border (Ceuta and Melilla). In that same line, it holds an Islamophobic stance: for example, it defends the welcoming of Christian migrants only.
- **Antifeminism and anti-LGBTI rights:** One of the policies for which Vox has been quite vocal is the repeal of the legislation on gender-based violence. It supports the ‘traditional’ family model, which is to be recognized as a pre-State institution. Moreover, Vox is challenging the existing consensus on same-sex marriage and combats the so-called ‘gender ideology’, “a supposed gay and feminist-led movement to subvert traditional families and social values.”¹⁰⁴
- **Moderate Euro-scepticism:** Vox does not advocate withdrawal from the EU, rather, it advocates a reformed EU that would abandon the federalist tendency. It calls for an inter-governmental EU, where States have the right to veto any policy. Regarding identity and cultural aspects, Vox is in line with the priorities of the Visegrad group, and advocates for the defence of Europe’s borders and Christian roots.
- **Climate change deniers:** There are no measures proposed which aim to combat climate change in Vox’s program. There are, however, some policy measures aiming at protecting bullfighting and hunting.
- Finally, regarding the **economic program**, despite inconsistencies, it adopts a liberal approach, advocating for drastic fiscal reductions. As the PorCausa Foundation notes, the discourse avoids debating economic issues and focuses instead on immigration and nationalism.¹⁰⁵

b) The impact of Vox: a breeding ground for extreme right-wing radicalization?

In light of these elements, the emergence of this party may create a breeding ground for right-wing radicalization, particularly among the youth. The anti-migration, anti-LGBTI and anti-feminist discourse has found its way into the media and political debates; Vox has successfully managed to contaminate other political parties’ discourses, especially the Popular Party and Citizens.¹⁰⁶ For example, the Popular Party’s leader resorted to anti-migration discourses during Andalusia’s campaign, stating that immigrants shall not be welcomed in Spain if they do not respect European traditions.¹⁰⁷ Likewise, all three parties often resort to confrontation both in their style and policies with regard to the management of the Catalan crisis. In some cases, Vox’s discourse may amount to open hate speech.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch, “Breaking the Buzzword: Fighting the “Gender Ideology” Myth,” accessed July 26, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/10/breaking-buzzword-fighting-gender-ideology-myth>.

¹⁰⁵ Pedro Fernández de Castro and Ana González-Páramo, (coord.). *‘La Franquicia Antimigración’*, 41.

¹⁰⁶ José Antequera, “Vox contamina la campaña con su discurso de odio,” Diario16, April 17, 2019,, accessed July 26, 2019, <https://diario16.com/vox-contamina-la-campana-con-su-discurso-de-odio/>.

¹⁰⁷ Pedro Fernández de Castro and Ana González-Páramo, (coord.). *‘La Franquicia Antimigración’*, 41.

¹⁰⁸ “La Fiscalía alerta de que algunos mensajes de Vox podrían alentar el discurso de odio,” El Mundo, January 19, 2019, accessed July 26, 2019, <https://www.elmundo.es/espaa/2019/01/19/5c430a8e21efa088018b46ac.html>.

Therefore, the influence of Vox on the political landscape must be taken into account, especially as it is conducting an efficient social media campaign, which is also designed to reach the youth. Vox is very active on social media platforms, using micro-targeting messaging and disinformation strategies, and has met with the international extreme right leader Steve Bannon on this issue.¹⁰⁹ For example, it is the Spanish political party with the highest number of Instagram followers (more than 527,000),¹¹⁰ which is one of the preferred social medias of Spanish youngsters. Similarly, it is the party which has the largest presence on Tik Tok, another social media outlet which is very popular among adolescents.¹¹¹

Thus, considering the growing toxic environment and the normalization of hate speech in the country, it is important to pay attention to how the Spanish youth is perceiving and responding to this political change.

4.3. Right-wing radicalization in the Spanish youth: a gap

During the last 15 years, particularly since the 2004 attacks in Madrid, there has been extensive literature published about radicalization in Spain. However, as we have seen in the case of international literature, these studies have focused almost solely on religion-based radicalization, while previously during the 1990s and the first few years of the 2000s, they had focused on the radicalization of Basque youngsters who joined or supported the terrorist group ETA. Therefore, with some exceptions that included also other types of violent extremism,¹¹² academic literature largely neglected the issue of right-wing radicalization among youngsters in Spain. This may be due to the perception that this was not a problem, precisely because of the so-called 'Spanish exceptionalism' explained above.

Yet Spain now presents several traits that are characteristic of a fertile breeding ground for right-wing radicalization. As stated by Knigge, support for right-wing extremism is facilitated by public dissatisfaction with the political regime and growing levels of immigration.¹¹³ On the one hand, there is a strong level of dissatisfaction with the political regime and the political class among the youth,¹¹⁴ as well as towards the governance of the public sector.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, levels of immigration are on the rise in Spain, notably as a result of the economic recovery.¹¹⁶

More importantly, anti-immigration discourse – which exaggerates the increase in immigration rates – is also growing, particularly since the irruption of the Vox party onto the Spanish political landscape.¹¹⁷ This discourse is more important than real immigration figures, even in a context of economic recovery, which is, theoretically, less prone to a growing xenophobic and anti-immigration rhetoric. As Cea D'Ancona shows, anti-immigration discourse may also grow in a favourable economic context, as the feeling of economic threat and cultural

¹⁰⁹ Pedro Fernández de Castro and Ana González-Páramo, (coord.). 'La Franquicia Antimigración', 42.

¹¹⁰ Last consulted on 28 March 2020.

¹¹¹ More info in : <https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20200311/473168996427/extrema-derecha-control-tiktok-red-social-menores.html>.

¹¹² Manuel Moyano and Humberto M. Trujillo. "Intention of activism and radicalism among Muslim and Christian youth in a marginal neighbourhood in a Spanish city/Intención de activismo y radicalismo de jóvenes musulmanes y cristianos residentes en un barrio marginal de una ciudad española," *Revista de Psicología Social* 29, no. 1 (2014): 90-120.

¹¹³ Pia Knigge, "The ecological correlates", 249-279.

¹¹⁴ Eusebio Megías (coord.), *Jóvenes y política. El compromiso con lo colectivo*. Madrid: FAD, 2005; Javier Elzo and Eusebio Megías (coord.), *Jóvenes y valores (I). Un ensayo de tipología*, Madrid: CRS-FAD, 2014.

¹¹⁵ Eusebio Megías (coord.), *Valores sociales y drogas 2010*. Madrid: FAD/Caja Madrid, 2010.

¹¹⁶ "Spain's population hits record level as immigrants flock in." *Financial Times*, June 25, 2019, accessed July 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/1a99dd14-975f-11e9-8cfb-30c211dcd229>. However, this statement should most likely be nuanced in the face of the expected impact of the Covid-19 on the economy.

¹¹⁷ Pedro Fernández de Castro and Ana González-Páramo, (coord.). Study on 'La Franquicia Antimigración'.

threat depend mostly "on the perceived presence of immigrants, along with the image and attention paid to immigration in the media and political discourse."¹¹⁸ Consequently, this perceived presence of immigrants is instrumental and highlights the role played by traditional and new social media.

In this respect, the Spanish youth does not seem adequately prepared for navigating into the current informative setting, which is deeply marked by increased levels of false information circulating through social media and political websites. According to a recent study (2018) on the influence of information and communication technologies on youngsters' socialization, 75% of Spanish teenagers lack the necessary training in critical thinking to be able to adequately navigate the web.¹¹⁹ Moreover, the absence of human rights education in relation to historical memory within the Spanish education curriculum may also contribute to this breeding ground, since youngsters, who have not suffered from the dictatorship themselves, are not really "vaccinated" against the consequences of hate speech and right-wing extremism.

Against this background, the attitudes and values towards diversity and tolerance of the Spanish youngsters are analysed in the next section. In light of the recent shift in Spain, it is crucial to keep track of the perception of Spanish youngsters towards diversity, in order to be able to anticipate any significant changes of attitudes that may help the dissemination of extreme right-wing ideology and hate speech. This analysis may help us identify priority areas for action.

¹¹⁸ M^a Ángeles Cea D'Ancona, "Immigration as a threat: Explaining the changing pattern of xenophobia in Spain," *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 17, no. 2 (2016): 569–591.

¹¹⁹ Juan Carlos Ballesteros Guerra and Laura Picazo Sánchez, *Las TIC y su influencia en la socialización de adolescentes* (Madrid: Fad, 2018).

5

Attitudes and values towards diversity and tolerance among the spanish youth

This section analyses the attitudes and values towards diversity and tolerance of the Spanish youth. The main objective of the analysis is threefold:

- Firstly, to assess the recent evolution of attitudes of the Spanish youth towards diversity, immigration and minority groups;
- Secondly, to analyse the inclination of the Spanish youth towards right-wing extremism, and assess the possible influence of variables such as education and gender;
- Thirdly, to identify specific geographic or socio-economic areas more prone to support extreme right-wing ideas, and therefore more prone to radicalization.

The main data source used for this analysis is the government-run *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS, Sociological Research Centre), the main public institution responsible for conducting opinion surveys in Spain, which was complemented by other analysis and reports. More concretely, data are taken from two publicly available datasets. On the one hand, the CIS survey about ‘Attitudes towards immigration’, which monitors the perceptions and attitudes of Spaniards towards immigration, was analysed. Since 2007, Spain’s Racism and Xenophobia Observatory (OBERAXE) commissions these polls and elaborates a subsequent analysis on the state of racist and xenophobic attitudes in the country, an analysis which is also considered for the interpretation of data. For the purposes of this report, a sample of young people was taken into account (people from 18 to 29 years old), and the polls of 2012 (nº 2969) and 2017 (nº 3190) were examined in order to analyse the evolution of attitudes, as the latter is the last poll published on this issue.


On the other hand, for the analysis on ideology and voting behaviour, the “Macrobarometer March 2019” (nº 3242) was used, a pre-electoral analysis of the General Elections that took place on 28 April 2019. For that survey, the fieldwork was conducted between 1 and 18 March 2019. It was the pre-electoral poll with the biggest sample (more than 16,000 people were interviewed) and the last public poll to be published before the national elections of 28 April 2019.

The analysis is organised into three sections. In the first section, the general attitudes towards diversity of Spanish youngsters are analysed. In the second section, the prevalence of intolerant attitudes among this age group is assessed. Finally, in the third section, the popularity of right-wing extremism among the youth and its impact on youngsters' voting behaviour are scrutinized.

5.1. General attitudes towards diversity

From a comparative perspective, and as the EU Barometer has repeatedly shown, Spaniards appear to be considerably tolerant, and more hospitable and welcoming than their European partners.¹²⁰ Moreover, the analysis of the successive surveys of attitudes towards and perceptions of immigration demonstrate a moderately favourable trend in all variables that measure racist, intolerant or xenophobic attitudes among respondents.¹²¹

In the case of young people, they seem to be even more tolerant towards diversity than adults. In **Chart 1** we observe the trend in attitudes towards diversity in terms of countries of origin, cultures, ethnicities ("skin colour"), and religions of immigrants, comparing young people and adults. The question was posed as follows: "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 'very positive', rate the fact that Spanish society is composed of people from different countries, with different religions, skin colours and cultures". As the chart clearly shows, young people show greater tolerance regarding diversity than adults.



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided by the CIS 2017
"Attitudes towards immigration."¹²²

In relation to specific topics, **Chart 1** shows that both young people and adults are less tolerant of diversity regarding religion. According to the OBERAXE report previously mentioned, this lower acceptance of religious diversity is probably related to the perception of Islam, whose

¹²⁰ Mercedes Fernández, Consuelo Valbuena and Raquel Caro, *Informe - Encuesta 2016. Evolución del racismo, la Xenofobia y otras formas de intolerancia en España* (OBERAXE, 2018).


¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 'very positive' the mean of tolerance was calculated between young people (18-29 years old) and adults (30 years old and above). The options "Don't know" / "No answer" were eliminated.

followers are often characterized as having strong cultural identities and, as a consequence, are less likely to integrate.

Following the same scale, in **Chart 2** we observe the evolution of the assessment of diversity. We see that in 2012 young people were also more tolerant towards diversity than adults.

Chart 2
Assessment of the diversity of Spanish culture regarding to religion, skin color, country and culture of the immigrants (CIS 2012-2017)



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided by the CIS 2017 "Attitudes towards immigration".¹²³

Therefore, the evolution of tolerance seems positive, on average: young people are more tolerant to diversity in 2017 than in 2012. This is coherent with the general results of OBERAXE that also identify a positive evolution since 2008.¹²⁴

5.2. Prevalence of intolerant attitudes amongst youngsters

a) Antipathy towards different groups of immigrants

Negative attitudes towards immigrants are also usually closely related to two main factors: the cultural distance perceived between groups of immigrants and the native population, and the size of the group in the country (Zapata-Barrero, 2009). Therefore, the bigger the group is in terms of population and the more different its culture is perceived, normally the greater the antipathy.


These two factors seem to explain the results of the variable of antipathy towards different groups of immigrants among young people in Spain. As **Chart 3** shows, the groups that

¹²³ On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means 'very negative' and 10 'very positive' the mean of tolerance was calculated between young people (18-29 years old) and adults (30 years old and above) for both periods (2012 and 2017).

¹²⁴ Mercedes Fernández, Consuelo Valbuena and Raquel Caro, *Informe - Encuesta 2016. Evolución del racismo, la Xenofobia y otras formas de intolerancia en España* (OBERAXE, 2018), 26.

received more antipathy among young respondents were: in first place were Arabs with 43%, then Roma people with 42%, and in third and fourth places, were Latin Americans and Asians.

Chart 3
Antipathy towards different groups of immigrants among young people (CIS 2017)



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided by the CIS 2017 "Attitudes towards immigration."¹²⁵


All responses were spontaneous, recorded and grouped by type.¹²⁶ In the case of Muslims, respondents mentioned particularly Moroccans, which is the foreign group with most presence in Spain: 1.6% of the total population. In the case of the Roma, respondents referred particularly to people coming from other European countries, which is a group that faces great discrimination all around Europe and is commonly perceived as different in terms of culture.

As **Chart 4** shows, the results were similar in the case of the adult population. Arabs/Muslims/Roma people are the groups that respondents reject the most. However, antipathy towards Arabs/Muslims/Moroccans is a little higher in the case of adults.

¹²⁵ The question was stated as follows: "Is there a group of immigrants that you like the least or have least sympathy for?". The "Don't know / No answer" and inaccurate rejection responses such as "all of them" or "none of them" were eliminated. Expressions regarding groups of immigrants were regrouped; for instance, if the person answered "Latinos", "Argentinians" or "Ecuadorians", their answers were regrouped into "Latin-Americans". Only people between 18 and 29 years old were selected.

¹²⁶ The question was stated as follows: "Is there a group of immigrants that you like the least or have least sympathy for?". The "Don't know / No answer" and inaccurate rejection responses such as "all of them" or "none of them" were eliminated. Expressions regarding groups of immigrants were also regrouped.

Chart 4
Antipathy towards different groups of immigrants among adults (2017 CIS)



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided by the CIS 2017 “Attitudes towards immigration”.


b) Negative perception of migration

The variable negative perception of migration provides valuable information about the sources of anti-immigration sentiment among youngsters. The question was asked after the previous question, about which group of immigrants was rejected the most, in this wording: “And why do you reject or have less sympathy for...?”. All responses were spontaneous, recorded and grouped by type.¹²⁷

As stated in **Chart 5**, the results emphasize that cultural differences are the aspect that respondents consider as more negative (44%), followed by crime and insecurity (33%), and immigrants being a source of poverty and social conflict (14%). Other factors regarding economic conditions, such as “they are a burden” (2.5%) or “increased competitiveness in the labour market” (1%) are less relevant if compared with cultural issues, as well as the response “excess of immigrants and irregularity” (2%).

¹²⁷ First, cultural differences include statements such as: “Because of their religious beliefs, because of their religious extremism, because of their different customs, because they do not integrate, because of their attitude towards women”; Second, crime and insecurity include statements such as “because of their links to crime and organised crime, because they create marginality, because they are violent and aggressive, because they are unreliable and bad people”; Third, source of poverty and social conflicts (bad behaviour, lack of civility and education) include statements such as “because they are arrogant, disrespectful, impolite, because they despise us”. Inaccurate responses of rejection were also included, such as “because of my bad personal experience”. The percentage calculation is made on the total number of answers given by young people.

Chart 5
Negative aspects regarding migration among young people (CIS 2017)




Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided by the CIS 2017 "Attitudes towards immigration."¹²⁸

However, if we look at the evolution of these attitudes, we observe that in a context of economic crisis the responses change. In **Chart 6**, we see how in 2012 young people were more worried about the labour market, while in 2017 they were much more worried about the cultural differences that migrations imply. Therefore, it seems that in a crisis context, young respondents pay more attention to the impact that migration may have on the labour market. Consequently, in times of economic recovery, cultural differences, particularly religion, play an even more prominent role in explaining antipathy *vis-à-vis* migration.

¹²⁸ The question was asked after consulting the respondent about which group of immigrants (s)he rejected the most; after that question, the following question was stated: And why do you reject or have less sympathy for...? The "Don't know / No answer" and "Other reasons for rejection" were eliminated. Only people between 18 and 29 years old were selected.

Chart 6
Negative aspects regarding migration among young people between 2012 and 2017



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided by the CIS 2017 and 2012 "Attitudes towards immigration."¹²⁹


c) Willingness to live in the same neighbourhood

Willingness to live in the same neighbourhood as many migrants is a common measure for tolerance towards diversity. According to the report "Barómetro Juvenil 2019: Discriminación y tolerancia hacia la diversidad", published in 2020 and based on data from May 2019,¹³⁰ most young people do not show discomfort when having persons from traditionally discriminated groups as neighbours. In particular, young women seem to be more willing to live in such places than young men. Apart from gender differences, **Chart 7** shows that people who are in a couple with someone born in another country are more willing to live in a neighbourhood where many immigrants reside. The results are very straightforward: 100% of young respondents who have a partner who was born abroad would accept living in a neighbourhood where there are many immigrants.

¹²⁹ The question was asked after consulting the respondent about which group of immigrants (s)he rejected the most; after that question, the following question was stated: And why do you reject or have less sympathy for...? The "Don't know / No answer" and "Other reasons for rejection" were eliminated. Only people between 18 and 29 years old were selected.

¹³⁰ Patricia Tudela Canaviri et al., "Barómetro Juvenil 2019: Discriminación y tolerancia hacia la diversidad". Madrid: Centro Reina Sofía sobre Adolescencia y Juventud, Fad.

Chart 7
Willingness to live in the same neighborhood where
many immigrants live among young people (CIS 2017)




Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided
by the CIS 2017 "Attitudes towards immigration."¹³¹

Even if the total number of responses was low, (the sample only took into account respondents whose partner was born in another country; a total of 21 people), the results are still interesting. Without exception, all answered that they would accept living in such a neighbourhood. If we compare this to adults (**Chart 8**), more than 20% of respondents would reject or try to avoid living in such a neighbourhood.

¹³¹ The question was stated as follows: "Please tell me in each case, if you accept, try to avoid, or reject living in the same neighbourhood where many immigrants live". That variable was crossed by the variable referred to if the respondent has a partner who was born in Spain or abroad. Here only people between 18 and 29 years old were selected.

Chart 8
Willingness to live in the same neighborhood where
many immigrants live among young people (CIS 2017)



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided
by the CIS 2017 "Attitudes towards immigration."¹³²

5.3. Ideology and voting behaviour


Another way to map the values and attitudes of the Spanish youth is to look at their ideology and voting behaviour.

a) Ideology and voting intentions: the importance of sex and education

Chart 9 clearly expresses that the youth is, in general, more positioned towards the left than adults. The average self-placement on the ideological scale among the youth is 3.9 (a centre left identification) while it reaches 4.4 among adults (closer to the centre).

¹³² The question was stated as follows: "Please tell me in each case, if you accept, try to avoid, or reject living in the same neighbourhood where many immigrants live". This was crossed by the variable referred to if the respondent has a partner who was born in Spain or abroad. Here only adults (30 years old and above) were selected.

Chart 9
Self perception of ideology for young people and adults (CIS 2017)




Moreover, we also see that young people tend to position themselves more towards the extremes than adults. On the one hand, there are more young respondents who identify with the extreme left than adults: 10% of young respondents *vis-à-vis* 8% of adults. On the other hand, there are also more young people who identify with the extreme right: while 3% of them identify with the extreme right (options 8 to 10 of the scale), the proportion is slightly lower among adults (2%).

It is also important to note that there is a high percentage (both young people and adults), who do not identify ideologically (22% among young people and 20% among adults).

According to the literature, in general, men are more attracted to the extreme right than women. In the case of Spanish youngsters, according to **Chart 10**, it seems that this is indeed the case: 6% of young men interviewed identified with that ideology, while only a 3% of women. Similarly, it seems that young women identify more with left-wing positions, while young men identify more with centre and right-wing positions.

Chart 10


Ideology from left to right crossed by sex (only young people CIS 2017)



Similarly, **Chart 11** shows that the voting intention for Vox is double for men (6%) than for women (3%). The distribution by sex in the case of adults is similar: according to the analysis of the same poll made by Eldiario.es, the voting intention of adult men was 5.3%, more than double that of adult women (2.5%).¹³³

Chart 11

Political party closest to their ideas between youngsters by sex (CIS 2019)



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided
by the CIS 2017 "Attitudes towards immigration."¹³⁴


¹³³ Ariane Aumaitre, "Cinco gráficos sobre los votantes de Vox: ¿en qué se parecen y diferencian del resto?" *Eldiario.es*, April 23, 2019, accessed July 2019, https://www.eldiario.es/piedrasdepapel/graficos-votantes-Vox-parecen-diferencian_6_891770836.html.

¹³⁴ The question was stated as follows: "In politics, the expressions 'left' and 'right' are normally used. On this card there are a series of boxes that go from left to right. In what box would you place yourself?". Here, only young people were selected; this variable was crossed by sex.

Another well-stated hypothesis in the literature is that people with a lower level of education are more likely to support the extreme right. According to many, far-right parties receive disproportionately large support from those with a lower level of education, specifically men.¹³⁵

However, **Chart 12** does not support that hypothesis for young people: the difference in terms of support for extreme right ideology of people with only elementary and high school studies¹³⁶ and people with university background is not significant: only 1%.

Chart 12
Ideology position by level of studies among youngs (CIS 2019)



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided by the CIS 2019 “pre-election study.”¹³⁷

While it is true that young respondents with a university background are more prone to identify as left-wing – and that young respondents with only elementary and high school studies identify more with the right – in the case of the extremes, the results are not that clear.


Still, if we look at **Chart 13**, we see more clearly that people with elementary and high school or technical studies are more likely to vote for the Vox party.

¹³⁵ Lubbers et al., 2002; Lewin-Epstein and Levanon, 2005; Arzheimer, 2009, quoted in: Inta Mierina and Ilze Koroļeva, “Support for far-right ideology,” 183-205.

¹³⁶ In Spain it is not possible to be young and “without studies”, since basic education has been compulsory for minors up to 16 years old since 1990.

¹³⁷ The question was stated as follows: “What is the political party closest to your ideas?” Here only young people crossed by level of studies for most voted (intentionally) parties.

Chart 13
Political party closest to their ideas between youngs
by educational level (CIS 2019) Most voted parties



Source: Own elaboration based on the data provided by the CIS 2019 "pre-election study."¹³⁸

b) Extreme right vote in the youth¹³⁹

The expectation of a high rate of young votes for Vox in the general elections of 28 April 2019, and the local and European elections of 26 May 2019, was only partially fulfilled. The success of their social media strategy,¹⁴⁰ among other factors, led some analysts to predict a high vote from young people for this party. Yet, according to the post-electoral study of Sociométrica, finally only 11.7% of young vote (18-30 years) chose Vox in the April national elections.¹⁴¹ Conversely, this age group selected mostly left-wing options, with the Socialist party (28.5%) and Unidas Podemos (18.5%) being the most voted for parties. In the European elections, the percentage was even lower: only 8% of young people voted for Vox (including people aged up to 35).¹⁴² These results led analysts such as Manuel Mostaza Barrios to point at a "ceiling for the ability of far-right groups to translate likes into votes."¹⁴³

However, in relation to the extent to which the Spanish youth is voting for Vox, it is important to consider that the various pre and post electoral analyses of the April elections show contradictory arguments. On the one hand, another analysis of the same preelectoral poll (CIS 2019) has concluded that age is not a significant predictor of voting for Vox.¹⁴⁴ Conversely, sex (being a man) or specific occupations (such as being a member of the State security and police forces) are much more important predictors of voting for that party. In a similar vein, the analysis of the vote for this party by neighbourhoods, suggested a high

¹³⁸ The question was stated as follows: "What is the political party closest to your ideas?" Here only young people crossed by educational level and just most voted parties.

¹³⁹ This section focuses mainly on the results of the general elections of 28 April 2019, and the local and European elections of 26 May 2019, and the second general elections of 2019, celebrated the 20 November.

¹⁴⁰ Manuel Viejo, "How Spain's far-right Vox created a winning social media strategy," *El País*, December 21, 2018, accessed July 2019, https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/12/19/inglisch/1545234565_871352.html.

¹⁴¹ Carmen Lucas-Torres, "El PP ganó las elecciones entre los jubilados pero empató en último lugar con Vox entre los jóvenes," *El Español*, 2 May 2019, accessed May 2020, https://www.elspanol.com/espaina/politica/20190502/pp-elecciones-jubilados-empato-ultimo-vox-jovenes/395211369_0.html.

¹⁴² Kiko Llaneras, "Jóvenes y mayores también votaron distinto en España," *El País*, June 1, 2019, accessed July 2019, https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/06/01/actualidad/1559401282_864708.html.

¹⁴³ Lori Hinnant, "Europe's far-right parties hunt down the youth vote," *AP news*, May 16, 2019, accessed July 2019, <https://www.apnews.com/7f177b0cf15b4e87a53fe4382d6884ca>.

¹⁴⁴ Ariane Aumaitre, "Cinco gráficos sobre los votantes de Vox: ¿en qué se parecen y diferencian del resto?" *Eldiario.es*, April 23, 2019, accessed July 2019, https://www.eldiario.es/piedrasdepapel/graficos-votantes-Vox-parecen-diferencian_6_891770836.html.

percentage of votes for Vox in military housing across the country, as well as in rich neighbourhoods in cities such as Madrid.¹⁴⁵

On the other hand, subsequent post-electoral analyses of the national elections give more importance to age as a predictor of voting for Vox. According to the analysis made by Lab RTVE,¹⁴⁶ based on the vote of big municipalities (more than 10,000 people), the strongest predictor of voting for Vox is age. More concretely, voting for this party is higher in municipalities with the highest percentage of young inhabitants, and it is also a significantly male vote. Moreover, it is also higher in municipalities with more foreigners and municipalities with higher income.

Interestingly, this last study does not show any relation between municipalities with high unemployment and voting for Vox (in these places, voting is higher for the Socialist party). The same holds true in municipalities with high percentages of people with no studies or only elementary education, as the tendency is to vote for the socialist party. The previously mentioned study of Eldiario.es agrees with this conclusion: the poorest neighbourhoods of the country voted mostly for the Socialist party.¹⁴⁷

In any case, an analysis of the result of the 10 November 2019 national elections shows a clear increase in the young voting for Vox. According to the analysis of Sociometrika (for El Español), the party received the highest percentage of votes among Spanish male youngsters (under 30): 19.4 % of them voted for Vox, while only 6.5% of young women voted for them.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, the post electoral Barometer of the CIS, published in January 2020 indicates that the growth of Vox in the 10N election was mainly based on the young vote, which had previously chosen less radical options.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ "En la zona militar de El Pardo se votó a Vox; en las 3.000 viviendas, al PSOE y en la muralla de Lugo, al PP: el 28A, al detalle." *Eldiario.es*, May 2, 2019, accessed July 2019, https://www.eldiario.es/politica/votaron-barrios-pobres-militares-barrio_0_894861358.html.

¹⁴⁶ José Á. Carpio, "Radiografía del voto: dime quién eres y te diré cómo votas," *RTVE*, April 30 2019, accessed July 2019, <http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20190430/datos-hablan-radiografia-del-voto-voto-grupos-sociales/1930141.shtml>.

¹⁴⁷ "En la zona militar de El Pardo se votó a Vox; en las 3.000 viviendas, al PSOE y en la muralla de Lugo, al PP: el 28A, al detalle." *Eldiario.es*, May 2, 2019, accessed July 2019, https://www.eldiario.es/politica/votaron-barrios-pobres-militares-barrio_0_894861358.html.

¹⁴⁸ Marta Espartero. "Vox y Podemos fueron los partidos más votados por los varones menores de 30 años el 10-N," *El Español*, 16 November 2019, accessed May 2020, https://www.elspanol.com/espana/politica/20191116/vox-podemos-partidos-votados-varones-menores-anos/444955990_0.html.

¹⁴⁹ Gonzalo Cortizo and Ana Ordaz, "La situación en Catalunya condicionó el voto de uno de cada cuatro electores el 10N, según el CIS", *Eldiario.es*, 16 January 2020, accessed May 2020, https://www.eldiario.es/politica/situacion-Catalunya-condiciono-electores-CIS_0_985501738.html.

6

Filling the gap: insight from expert interviews

This section presents an analysis of 12 interviews conducted between January and April 2020 with relevant experts, who represent different perspectives of analysis of the phenomenon of extreme right-wing radicalization of young people (for the list of people interviewed, see Annex 1).

The results of these interviews are organised into four sections: first, we present an overview of the Spanish context, with regards to extreme right radicalization of young people; second, we describe how the ideological sector of the extreme right in this country is organised, paying attention to the most important organised groups and their perceived influence on youngsters; third, we delve into the main explanatory factors of extreme right radicalization among the youth, in the particular context of Spain; and, fourth, we present some good practices and recommendations, based on the advice and suggestions of the respondents.

6.1. Extreme right radicalization among the youth in Spain: an overview

Regarding the general situation of extreme right radicalization among the youth in Spain, most interviewees consider that we have not yet reached an alarming situation. According to experts such as Esteban Ibarra, president of the NGO *Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia*, so far, young Spaniards have not shown symptoms of great radicalization; on the contrary, they have shown a higher degree of tolerance than in neighbouring countries (as was exposed by data analysis in section 5.1). Still, he perceives that youngsters' attitudes are changing due to a new setting where intolerance and polarization are increasing; more concretely, according to him, polarization is especially worrying, particularly in high schools, where tension is rising between extreme right and extreme left groups, a trend that he characterizes as coming back to "Civil war dynamics".

This is not an isolated opinion: there is a general perception that the current context, marked by the progressive normalization of hate speech, along with a growing polarization in the political sphere, generates the appropriate conditions for extreme right radicalization.

Therefore, there is a general perception that more worrying levels of right-wing radicalization could be reached in the coming years.

Thus, a recurring idea in the interviews is that the Spanish context is at present more prone to extreme right radicalization than it was five years ago, basically due to two factors: the transformation of the media landscape and the arrival of the Vox party to the institutions. On the one hand, several interviewees emphasize the generalization and progressive normalization of hate speech in society. More specifically, Lucila Rodríguez, director of the PorCausa Foundation, places in 2015 a “paradigm shift in which hate speech becomes a new communicative narrative in itself.” As a result, in recent years, hate speech has become a new shared “common sense”, which occurs when intolerant messages begin “to be accepted and embraced socially.” More worryingly, according to her, it is not only young people, but the entire society that is “turning towards extremes.”

The main reason behind this shift is easily pinpointed by all the people interviewed: the generalization of the use of social media. Along the same line as Lucila Rodríguez, Núria Millán, specialist in Prevention of Violent Extremisms at NOVACT, also places the turning point in the last five years and indicates the emergence of social media as a polarizing element in society, since “they facilitate the spreading of fake news, which generates greater polarization.” Likewise, Xavier Torrens, professor at the University of Barcelona (UB) and expert in preventing radicalization, delves into the same idea, stating that “the intensive use of social media is leading to an increase in polarization, basically because of how their algorithms are designed”, which especially affects young people, “for whom this channel is a pole of attraction.”

On the other hand, another milestone indicated by all the people interviewed is the arrival of the Vox party to Spanish institutions at the end of 2018. Indeed, as it was explained in section 5.3, in the last national elections in April and November 2019, many youngsters voted for that party, as Laura Galaup, a journalist from Eldiario.es specialized in the extreme right, recalled. Likewise, there is agreement among interviewees to consider that this party’s access to the institutions will contribute to further legitimate and spread their discourse. According to Xavier Torrens: “the fact that a radical right-wing party has entered both regional and national parliaments will undoubtedly favour these processes of radicalization among young people, since it will involve the socialization and legitimization of extreme right ideas”.

Worryingly, several interviewees emphasized the lack of preparation of the Spanish youth to resist right-wing extremism in this new context, coinciding with what was already suggested in section 4.3. On the one hand, various interviewees pointed to the lack of democratic and anti-fascist culture in the country, unlike other European states such as, for example, Germany. On this matter, María Rodríguez, vice-president of the Council of the Youth of Spain (CJE), mentions the difficulties that many young people face in identifying “intolerant or even fascist ideas”, since “the Spanish youth does not know what fascism is, because it is a subject that we hardly study at school.” David F. de Arriba, a high school teacher and writer, elaborates on this idea, stating that “there are issues which, for many years, we have not worked on properly and the consequence is a lack of democratic culture in some cases, or ignorance about the values of human rights.”

Therefore, this lack of preparation of young people in an environment where hate speech and polarization are widespread, can create the right conditions for their radicalization. The consequences of this lack of knowledge may be very serious. Marta Simó, professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, and specialist in the memory of the Holocaust in Spain, also draws attention to this, stating: “if young people are bombarded with this ideology without knowing what is behind it or what the origin is, they will end up being incited to

hatred out of ignorance.” Similarly, other interviewees emphasized the lack of critical thinking and skills related to media literacy, which prevent young people from being able to adequately filter the content they receive through social media and instant messaging systems. These tools are especially important today, since, as Pedro Rojo, president of the Al Fanar Foundation for Arab Knowledge, points out, “we live in a society in which everything is more instantaneous and there is no place for reflection.”

This lack of anti-fascism culture in the country may be related to a change of attitudes towards democracy and human rights, identified in the last years among the youth: as deputy director of the Reina Sofía Center on Adolescence and Youth Anna Sanmartin stated in her interview, periodic studies about values show that there is a growing support for the death penalty, as well as an increasing attraction to order and strong governments,¹⁵⁰ a clear indicator of right-wing extremism (as mentioned in section 2.1). This change of values may be one of the factors explaining the popularity of some extreme right movements among the young, which will be examined in the next section.

6.2. Main actors and their influence on youngsters

The interviews reflect the diversity of the extreme right landscape in Spain, even if at present it is clearly dominated by the political party Vox. According to Xavier Torrens, two large families can be identified on the Spanish extreme right: the *neo-fascist right*, which reflects the tradition of European fascism, in particular the variety of Spanish Francoist authoritarianism; and the *new extreme or radical right*, which differs from that of the neo-fascist right, because it adapts to the 21st century and to particular national contexts. According to Torrens, the great party of the extreme right in Spain is Vox, a group that brings together the two ideological poles of the extreme right, the neo-fascist and the radical, which confirms what was mentioned in the literature review.

Despite the vocation of the party to dominate this part of the political spectrum, as Esteban Ibarra points out, it is necessary to differentiate two major types of actors based on their position, with respect to the democratic system: on the one hand, Vox, which is a pro-system party, since it recognizes democracy and its fundamental institutions and rejects the use of direct violence; and on the other hand, other political organisations that are closer to anti-system positions, that question the regime of liberal democracy and show a more ambiguous position regarding the use of violence to achieve political aims. According to the interviewees, the following groups stand out among these kinds of political organisations: Hogar Social, Spain 2000, Democracia Nacional, Falange and Alternativa Española.

As presented in the previous section, all interviewees agree that the arrival of Vox to institutions was a turning point, especially because it has provided a platform to legitimise extreme right ideas, as well as role models for young people. In this sense, Lucila Rodriguez highlights that Vox is even more dangerous than other options – which are apparently more extreme – since the party “has the capacity to offer a narrative framework that reaches the ambivalent.” Regarding the influence that the arrival of this party may have among young people, several interviewees noted the influence that its leaders can provide as role models or references. In this sense, Xavier Torrens draws attention to the special impact of public

¹⁵⁰ She referred to the comparison between two studies conducted in 2009 and 2014 by the Reina Sofía Center on Adolescence and Youth. More information here: <https://www.fad.es/noticias/los-jovenes-espanoles-mas-conservadores-y-mas-implicados-en-lo-social/>.

figures that defend and spread extremist ideas among the youth, since they can be identified as “role models to follow.”

In this sense, interviewees, in general, considered this party as a very attractive option for young people for different reasons. Indeed, according to David F. de Arriba, spreading its messages has become “a trend among teenagers”. As for the reasons behind this, Laura Galaup emphasizes that the leaders of this party show themselves “as the standard-bearers of ‘politically incorrect’ thought, that appeals to the rebellious feeling characteristic among the youth.” According to her, this party encourages young people to “be the dissident in their class, to discuss with their teachers, to avoid being ‘indoctrinated’, particularly with respect to issues that have reached a high level of political and social consensus, such as the Gender Violence Law and the rights of LGBTI people”. Moreover, she also highlights that the leaders of this party try to present themselves as “close to the people”, spending time talking to and listening to the problems of the younger members who go to their rallies.

Indeed, several interviewees underlined the efforts that this party is making to reach the youth, not only through its intensive use of social media. As Núria Millán argues, this is because Vox’s rhetoric on social media “appeals to and reinforces the feeling of belonging, with direct, simple messages that seek to awaken emotions.” Another strategy mentioned by Laura Galaup is the use of groups within messaging systems such as Telegram or WhatsApp, which are used to establish a position to follow and to “create” opinion each time a controversy arises in the public debate; according to her, along with social media, these platforms are the “main channel they use to spread hate messages or intolerant content.”

In addition to these informal channels, María Rodríguez affirmed that this party is formalizing its youth representation structures. Specifically, she indicated that in some autonomous communities they have already constituted youth sections (in addition to the informal groups that already existed until now) and have requested their entry into a Youth Council (in this case the Community of Madrid).

Therefore, it seems that Vox is consolidating itself as an attractive option for young Spaniards, to the detriment of more extreme right-wing options. However, as several interviewees have noted, this could also change in the near future, as part of their followers could look for more extreme political options if they feel disappointed with a party that is not, after all, antisystem. As argued by Jon E. Illescas, sociologist and author of the book *Toxic Education* (“La Educación Tóxica”, El Viejo Topo: 2020): “if Vox disappoints its electorate by touching power, it could create an opportunity for parties more towards the extreme right to come together to reach that disappointed electorate.” Along the same lines, Esteban Ibarra acknowledged this concern, taking into account that the “true far-right parties such as Hogar Social, Spain 2000, Democracia Nacional, Falange and Alternativa Española, have been trying to reach the youngest since the beginning of the Internet,” so that “if one day they organise themselves, they could be the next Golden Dawn or Spanish NPD.”

6.3. Key explanations and factors

In section 3.2. this study presented a series of factors that, according to the academic literature, have been identified as key in the radicalization processes of the extreme right among the youth: education and socialization, membership in certain subcultures, socioeconomic factors, media environment and social media and the Internet. Interviewees were asked about the importance of these in the context of Spain and overwhelmingly pointed at the exposure to

hate speech, particularly through social media; they also pinpointed socialization and socio-socio-economic factors as very relevant.

a) The most relevant factor: exposure to hate speech through traditional and social media

As already mentioned, interviewees unanimously shared the opinion that **exposure to hate speech**, through traditional and social media, contributes to increasing intolerant attitudes among young people. More specifically, all interviewees also broadly agree on the particular importance of **social media as vehicles of hate speech**, and its current role in the consolidation of extreme right ideas among the youth.

Furthermore, most interviewees underlined the relation between the normalization of hate speech, particularly through the Internet, and the use of **right-wing violence**.¹⁵¹ According to Carlos Morán, Director of the National Office Against Hate Crimes of the Ministry of Interior of Spain, hate crime reports in Spain show the importance of the Internet as the most used channel in the acts relating to hate speech, followed by social media.¹⁵² However, whether or not the exposure to this discourse is a sufficient condition for violent right-wing radicalization is not clear, as expressed both by interviewees (Carlos Moran among others) and in the specialized literature (as explained in section 3.2). Therefore, it is likely that other factors must come into play.

b) Socialization, mainstream culture and subcultures

In addition to exposure to hate speech through traditional and social media, the interviews shed some light onto the role of socialization that was frequently connected with the role of subcultures and the general mainstream youth culture. On the one hand, the importance of **socialization** was identified by some interviewees, such as Lucila Rodríguez, who paid attention to how the close circle of young people responds to hate speech and existing polarization. As she put it, taking into account this context of polarization, the possibilities for the youth “to rebel and radicalize, will depend on how these ideas are confronted in their environment, in particular in schools and families.” Anna Sanmartín also insisted on the relation between exposure to hate speech on social media and socialization: “the capacity to filter adequately what you receive from social media depends on the context in which you grow up.”

On the other hand, and also in relation to the socialization of young people, particularly in peer groups, all the people interviewed agree on giving little weight to the extreme right **subcultures** in Spain. Still, Esteban Ibarra highlights that these subcultures could grow in importance in the short term, especially given the possible disappointment of part of the young electorate with Vox, which may be considered too moderate and may generate a search for more radical political options, as mentioned in the previous section.

¹⁵¹ We remind the reader that, in the framework of this study, right-wing violence includes both direct, structural and cultural violence, such as hate speech (as explained in section 2.1 c).

¹⁵² According to the 2018 report, 45.2% of the acts relating to hate speech that are known to the Spanish Security Forces were committed through the Internet, followed by Social Media (25.9%). Less common were other forms of communication such as telephony/communications (13.3%) and the mass media. For more information: <http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/642012/3479677/Informe+2018+sobre+la+evoluci%C3%B3n+de+los+delitos+de+odio+English+version.pdf/1767a25c-cfb6-42c1-8876-c1534d825158>.

Apart from these specific subcultures, according to various interviewees, it is also worth looking at worrying elements in **mainstream youth culture**, as well as the influence of young idols, such as YouTubers and pop stars. On the one hand, the role of right-wing social media influencers that spread intolerant ideas have been pinpointed by interviewees, who mentioned individual figures and specific social media accounts.¹⁵³ On the other hand, experts such as Jon E. Illescas also underlined the impact of the general values reflected in mainstream youth culture and the main idols. According to him, “the main youth references, and especially the most renowned musical artists, reflect in their lyrics and video clips constant speeches of the cult of wealth and symbolic violence against women”; this is combined with a very materialistic vision of people, based on the idea that “if you have nothing you are not worth it.” Therefore, in his opinion, sexism and the cult of wealth existing in mainstream music also enhance and normalize misogynistic and aporophobic ideas among the youth, which may impinge a dehumanized vision of some groups, such as women and the poor.

c) Socio-economic factors

As discussed in section 3.2., there is considerable disagreement in the literature regarding the relevance of **socioeconomic factors** as drivers of right-wing ideology, in relation to others based on identity. This disagreement was widely reflected among the interviewees as well. On the one hand, a group of interviewees argued that the current socioeconomic context is the perfect breeding ground for right-wing extremism, as it is characterized, among other things, by precariousness and low wages (Lucila Rodríguez), inequality (Núria Millán) and difficulties in accessing housing (David F. de Arriba). According to María Rodríguez from the CJE, precarious living conditions among young people have generated “the basic breeding ground to feed the extreme right radicalization among the youth.” Similarly, Lucila Rodríguez also emphasizes that “young people cannot aspire to the well-being that their parents enjoyed, what is more, what seemed to us ridiculous wages a few years ago, are today a panacea.” Consequently, this scenario generates what Núria Millán describes as a “situation of hopelessness among the youth,” as “there has never been a generation as academically prepared as now, but with so few or such precarious expectations and working conditions.”

In relation to the importance of socioeconomic factors as a determinant of radicalization, another recurring idea is that, by not facing this lack of material prospects among the youth, progressive parties have left a vacuum that the extreme right has taken advantage of. According to David F. de Arriba, in recent decades, left-wing parties “have abandoned the middle and lower class electorate,” which has created “frustration and even a sense of betrayal [among young people], which the extreme right has used to blame those who have arrived last, such as migrants.” Likewise, in this context, many of the narratives advocated by the left have failed. As Jon E. Illescas indicates, “radicalization occurs because there are no answers to the material needs of many young people, who live in very negative environments.” The ideas considered as “politically correct” – which include “tolerance and interculturality” – are not that attractive to these social groups, so they search for other ideological frameworks that do respond to their concerns.

¹⁵³ Interviewees have mentioned some examples of individuals or accounts with influence among the young, including: the accounts of party leaders (such as Melisa Domínguez Ruiz, head of Hogar Social Madrid, or Bertrand Ndongo, of Vox); the channels of youtubers, such as Isaac Parejo (infovlogger) or Un Tio Blanco Hetero; artists (Sofía Rincón); and journalists (Hermann Tertsch).

On the other hand, it should be noted that, for other interviewees, these socioeconomic factors are not so relevant. Regarding intolerant attitudes, Anna Sanmartin mentions that, among the young, data shows that religiosity and gender (being a cis gender male) are a much stronger predictor than socioeconomic status.¹⁵⁴ According to Laura Galaup, in fact, in the meetings and events that Vox organises, there are people from all socioeconomic backgrounds. Therefore, for her, the most important factor for young people is to be exposed to the political polarization that is shared in traditional and social media. Likewise, she also points to the factor of “toxic masculinity”, when mentioning the lack of presence of groups of young women at these events. In a similar vein, but also recognizing some relevance of socioeconomic factors, Lucila Rodríguez attaches more importance to the media environment, which is, according to her, what has really changed in recent years.

6.4. Good practices and recommendations

A very important insight from the interviews are some good practices and specific recommendations for action aimed at public administration and civil society organisations. These practices include **short-term interventions**, such as **reporting hate speech and hate crimes** to the authorities. In that regard, Esteban Ibarra stresses that the protection of victims must be considerably improved to tackle underreporting, as many victims of hate speech and crime do not report it due to a lack of awareness of the existence of legislation that protects them. Carlos Morán agrees with this statement but also mentions the considerable improvement of registration mechanisms since 2013.

Other interviewees point at **long-term interventions**, particularly **economic redistribution** and improving the quality of **social services**. In the opinion of Jon E. Illescas, the key action to prevent radicalization among young people would be tackling inequality, through more equitable tax policies and a stronger welfare system. Similarly, Lucila Rodríguez pays attention to the preventive role of improving social services, such as education and health, which promote contact and exchange among different groups. In her opinion, “common experiences, such as sharing the doctor’s waiting room or attending the same schools or the same cultural events, stress that we all have the same types of problems.”

More specifically, interviewees also point at more specific actions, which are directed at preventing the spread of intolerant attitudes through better communication and awareness practices, education, and community building activities.

a) Education and culture

There is a general agreement on the necessity to improve **human rights education**. According to several interviewees, such as David F. de Arriba and Marta Simó, the public administration should modify the general education curricula, to ensure that human rights education is incorporated into the whole education system as a compulsory subject. More concretely, David F. de Arriba and Xavier Torrens stress that these programs should be integrated at all levels, including higher education, while Esteban Ibarra argues that in order to prevent polarization, it is particularly relevant to work in secondary schools with teenagers between 13 and 16 years old.

¹⁵⁴ She refers to this report, published in 2020: <https://www.adolescenciayjuventud.org/publicacion/barometro-juvenil-2019-tolerancia/>

As for the specific content of human rights education programs, various respondents point at including democracy and the rule of law, historical memory, and intercultural practices. First, María Rodríguez states that human rights education, apart from stressing the basic idea that “all people have human rights,” it should also include “explaining the meaning of **democracy** and the limits of the rule of law.” Second, she also highlights the importance of including **historical memory** in human rights education, along with David F. de Arriba and Marta Simó. Third, Núria Millán also points at intercultural education practices, that “show the advantages of living together in diversity and present immigrants ‘as people to learn from.’” Finally, Xavier Torrens warns that general programs that promote human rights do not work: “human rights should be approached individually, as well as specific types of prejudice, stereotypes have to be challenged one by one.”

Furthermore, many interviewees argue that, in this context, human rights education should be complemented by improving **digital literacy and critical thinking**. María Rodriguez points at the importance of tackling disinformation, through training the young “in media literacy and critical thinking, so that they have the capacity to generate their own opinions and to think critically.” Laura Galaup underlines the importance of media literacy, as young people should “be able to differentiate between news and fake news.” More specifically, she argues that adults should also know more about digital and media literacy, particularly parents and teachers. Consequently, she recommends that “journalist associations train teachers and students, as well as parents.” More concretely, Marta Simó thinks “the main problem we are facing nowadays is that teachers do not yet have the necessary tools nor the specific training to teach students how to think critically.” Therefore, in her opinion, it is key that “educational centres are provided with the appropriate **educational tools** to learn about how to prevent these intolerant discourses”; David F. de Arriba agrees on this, stressing that “specific resources to work in the classroom are required.”

Finally, interviewees such as Xavier Torrens and Pedro Rojo also highlight the role of **culture** in tackling prejudice, stereotypes and, in general, discriminatory discourses. Xavier Torrens stresses the importance of “promoting cultural programs aimed at dismantling stereotypes” and intercultural values, such as “contact and appreciation of diversity.” He also considers that “those programs [should be made] available to everyone, for example, through the cultural centres in all the neighbourhoods.” In regard to the appropriate cultural means to transmit those values, he identifies “the arts, painting, comics, theatre, gastronomy,” broadcast on “TV, radio, social media, etc.”. More concretely, Pedro Rojo underlines the role of intercultural narratives transmitted through general popular culture, pointing at the special role of mass media.

b) Community-building

Almost all interviewees recommend community-building practices. Specifically, in line with the contact theory explained above (section 3.2), most interviewees agree on the importance of generating **intercultural spaces**, creating “meeting spaces, where exchanges between all people are promoted” (Núria Millán). Similarly, Marta Simó recommends the promotion of projects at community level “involving schools, civil society, and the associative fabric of neighbourhoods”, with the aim of “ensuring citizens’ participation and social cohesion.” Jon E. Illescas alludes to offering “healthy leisure activities for youngsters,” within their interests (using, for instance, music), and where people from different origins are involved, in order to generate social cohesion. This idea of promoting cohesion is also stressed by Lucila Rodriguez,

who highly recommends “community projects that seek to promote social and intergenerational cohesion in the most depressed neighbourhoods of big cities.

These practices, apart from generating social cohesion, are seen as crucial to prevent radicalization. As Pedro Rojo puts it: “to avoid radicalism, the first thing is to work to have an inclusive society.” Consequently, instead of spending public money in projects based on securitization, such as the PRODERAE program in Catalonia,¹⁵⁵ he recommends “investing in educational and inclusion projects”, so that “those young people who may be vulnerable to an environment of extremist positions, learn another series of values where these extremist concepts are questioned.”

c) Communication and awareness

Interviewees, such Esteban Ibarra, stress the importance of conducting campaigns where intolerant arguments are challenged and values such as tolerance, respect and diversity are promoted among the young. However, in order for these campaigns to be successful, Lucila Rodríguez argues that both public administration and civil society organisations should improve their communication practices. More specifically, she explains that campaigns should not be “against racism” instead, they should be directed at “integrating minorities into society, breaking ‘othering’ dynamics.” According to her, it is crucial that “the other” starts to be seen as an equal, as neighbours.

¹⁵⁵ He is referring to the Protocol of Prevention, Detection and Intervention in Processes of Radicalization in Education Centers (PRODERAE), a program was designed by the police force of Catalonia, the Mossos d’Esquadra, and its Department of Education. It was first launched in 2016 and updated after the terrorist attacks of Barcelona and Cambrils in August 2017. More information at: <https://opev.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Briefing-paper-PRODERAI.pdf>.

7

Conclusions

Nowadays, different contextual factors facilitate the spread of hate speech and extreme right-wing ideas among Spanish youngsters. On the one hand, the rise of far-right anti-immigration movements and parties in other European countries provides international allies and information resources that help nation-based far-right movements to expand. On the other, the general disinformation environment in traditional and social media is helping these movements convey their message, contributing to the dissemination of hate-based fake news and hate speech. The recent accession of the extreme-right to Spanish institutions demonstrates the influence of that trend, and the end of Spain's exceptionalism: after almost 40 years of absence, the Spanish ultra-nationalist right, with its anti-immigration, anti-minorities and anti-feminist discourse, has returned to the institutions.

Moreover, the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic have increased uncertainty about the future, particularly for the young, who already faced difficulties to access the job market and now see the possibility of a sufficient and stable income increasingly fading away. The real impact of this crisis is still to be seen, but the consequences for a young generation trapped between two recessions appear to be serious.

Against this backdrop, the main conclusion of this report is that young Spanish people do not seem sufficiently well equipped to resist this discourse. The general lack of knowledge regarding the ideological and historical foundations of the extreme right in the country, combined with the lack of critical thinking, digital literacy, and consistent human rights education within the Spanish curriculum, paves the way for right-wing extremism. Furthermore, long-term dissatisfaction with the institutions and disappointment with the political class also contributes to a breeding ground for right-wing radicalization. In fact, as the different sources of information used in this report show, the Spanish extreme-right is actively trying to reach younger people, and they are succeeding, as this ideology is increasingly attractive to them, particularly to men.

Taking this general assessment as a starting point, one of the aims of this report was to identify possible hotbeds of intolerance, either specific subcultures or specific geographic or socioeconomic areas, which may be more prone to radicalization. To do that, it is necessary to

look at what are the factors that explain radicalization. According to the academic literature reviewed in this study, five factors are particularly relevant: education and socialization, membership in certain subcultures, socioeconomic factors, media environment and social media and the Internet. Interviewees were asked about the importance of these in the context of Spain and overwhelmingly pointed at the exposure to hate speech, particularly through social media; they also pinpointed socialization and socio socio-economic factors as very relevant. As the weight of these different factors is not clear – in particular, there is not sufficient evidence to affirm that specific socio-economic areas may be more vulnerable to right-wing radicalization – looking at young votes to extreme right-wing parties may be a good way to identify these hotbeds.

On the other hand, another aim of this study was to find **good practices and recommend policy actions**. Based on the analysis of the different sources, we present hereafter some general recommendations (which must be read in conjunction with the selection of good practices presented in annex 2):

Firstly, to adequately draw strategies to prevent right-wing radicalization, it seems crucial to both attend to socio-economic factors, such as youth unemployment and income, and more cultural or identity-based factors, such as intolerant discourse shared by traditional and social media. According to the different sources analysed in this report, it seems that, along with their material conditions, youngsters' perceptions of issues such as migration, which is strongly influenced by the narratives of traditional and social media, have a relevant impact on radicalization. Thus, both working on improving the material conditions of the youth, which is especially important during periods of economic crisis, as well as promoting a healthy media environment, are of utmost importance in preventing right-wing radicalization.

Secondly, promoting community practices and contact activities among groups also seems to be a good way to tackle the prejudices that are the basis of intolerant attitudes. In line with the contact theory, most interviewees agree on the importance of generating intercultural spaces, such as projects at community level that involve different communities and actors, such as schools and entities, as well as healthy leisure activities for youngsters, that involves people with different backgrounds.

Thirdly, fostering human rights education, critical thinking, and digital literacy is absolutely key in the present context. Human rights education programs should be introduced at all levels of education, and its contents should include the foundation of democracy and the rule of law, historical memory and intercultural education practices, particularly knowledge of the meaning and importance of prejudice in intercultural relations. Equally important, human rights education should be complemented by improving digital literacy and critical thinking. The best way to protect youngsters from intolerant discourses and disinformation is to give them the tools to understand digital communication and to think critically.

Final note

This study contributed to addressing the existing gap in the literature regarding right-wing radicalization among Spanish youngsters, but it does present some significant limitations. Apart from the analysis of academic literature, this report is based on the analysis of available data sources and a set of 12 semi-structural interviews. On the one hand, regarding the data, the lack of empirical studies addressing right-wing radicalization hinders a deeper understanding of those processes. Similarly, studies on youngsters' attitudes are frequently fragmented and not published periodically, making it difficult to grasp its evolution. On the

other hand, and in regard to the interviews, another limitation is that this report includes the perspective of experts, but not of the youngsters themselves. Therefore, to have a more accurate picture of the issue under analysis, this study should be complemented by others focusing on the evolution of youngsters' attitudes towards diversity, their ideological inclinations and their interest and consideration of politics and democracy, as well empirical studies addressing processes of right-wing radicalization which may shed light on the factors and causes that explain them. Understanding youngsters' aspirations, fears and grievances is crucial in these volatile times.

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Annexes

1. List of interviewees

- 1) Esteban Ibarra, president of the NGO Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia, <http://www.movimientocontralaintolerancia.com/>.
- 2) Lucila Rodríguez, director of the PorCausa Foundation, <https://porcausa.org/>.
- 3) Xavier Torrens, professor of Political Science, Universitat de Barcelona (UB); director of the Master's program about Prevention of Radicalization, https://www.ub.edu/web/ub/en/estudis/oferta_formativa/masters_propis/fitxa/P/201911349/index.html?.
- 4) Jon E. Illescas, sociologist and author of the book *Educación Tóxica. El imperio de las pantallas y la música dominante en niños y adolescentes* (El Viejo Topo, 2020).
- 5) David F. de Arriba, high school teacher and author of the book *Memoria y viñetas: La memoria histórica en el aula a través del cómic* (Desfiladero, 2019).
- 6) Núria Millán, expert on prevention of violent extremism in NOVACT, <https://novact.org/?lang=en>.
- 7) María Rodríguez, vice-president of Consejo de la Juventud de España (CJE), <http://www.cje.org/es/>.
- 8) Laura Galaup, journalist expert on extreme right-wing in Spain in the journal *Eldiario.es*.
- 9) Marta Simó, professor at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) and member of the group Research in Sociology of Religion (ISOR), <http://isor.cat/en/membres/1232/>.
- 10) Pedro Rojo, president of the Al Fanar Foundation for Arab Knowledge, <http://www.fundacionalfanar.org/>.
- 11) Anna Sanmartín, deputy director of the Reina Sofía Center on Adolescence and Youth, <https://www.adolescenciacayjuventud.org/>.

12) Carlos Morán Ferrés, Director of National Office Against Hate Crimes of the Ministry of Interior of Spain, <http://www.interior.gob.es/web/servicios-al-ciudadano/delitos-de-odio>.

2. Selection of good practices

We hereby present a selection of good practices for the prevention of right-wing extremism among young Spanish people. These are 20 successful experiences directed at preventing the spread of intolerant attitudes among the young, that approach this subject from different areas.

To build this compendium we have relied on a series of criteria inspired by previous studies (Fighting Racism and Discrimination, UNESCO; Concrete Policies, Practices, and Partnerships to Promote Implementation of the Global Compacts for Migrants and Refugees, NGO Committee on Migration; Good practices template, FAO, and Criteria to select best practices - a proposal from the European Commission). However, above all, we have built our criteria on the recommendations provided by the people interviewed in this research, understanding that the prevention of radicalization is done from the construction of community, mutual knowledge, the dissolution of the “us versus them” narrative and the strengthening of social cohesion.

We have therefore included as good practice those initiatives that have been implemented in Spain over the last ten years and which fall into one or more of the following categories:

- a) Research projects focused on generating knowledge about young people's opinions and attitudes towards immigration and prejudice.
- b) Projects focused on the creation of materials (manuals, methodologies, guides) that are made available to society.
- c) Community-building initiatives that generate intercultural meeting spaces at a neighbourhood or local level.
- d) Educational experiences that address education for citizenship, digital literacy and critical thinking in a formal and non-formal environment.
- e) Communication/awareness projects that open public spaces of knowledge and debate about intercultural societies.
- f) Networking generation initiatives with the aim of bringing together diverse social agents around a common objective.

The experiences gathered here have been selected for their sustainable and replicable character and because they stimulate social transformation, through the participation of young people. The collaborative potential of the proposals has also been taken into account, which are either developed in partnership or materialised in environments that bring together administrations, civil society organisations, educational centres, and companies. Furthermore, they stand out for the soundness of the solutions provided, which are included in the section on key success factors, and for their innovative spirit at the time they were launched, which is included in the section on findings.

We hope they will provide inspiration to work with young people in preventing extremism.

a) Research

Are young people from Huelva racist? A five-school case study.

Manuel Mena Fernández,
University of Granada,
Spain, 2016.

- ABSTRACT: This piece of scientific research aims to show the drivers of the sociocultural conflict that has been affecting the province of Huelva during the last decade. It studies the dimensions that the conflict comprises, perpetuating conditions of inequality that are sometimes observed within certain social groups, mainly immigrants. The population of study consists of both male and female students between the ages of 14 and 18, in upper secondary education (3rd and 4th year), as well as 1st and 2nd year Baccalaureate students. In numbers, approximately 14,270 upper secondary and college students, including a high number of immigrant students, during the 2014/2015 academic year.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Local focus.
 - Significant number of participants.
 - Inclusion of social and geographic nuances.
- FINDINGS:
 - The problematization of the issue of migration among young people.
 - Marked pattern of otherness.
 - Progressive political attitudes may coexist with light or subtle racism. The need to consider contradictory responses in the actions that are developed with young people.
- Are young people from Huelva racist? A five-school case study (Spanish).

Research on discriminatory attitudes among young people from Córdoba.

Andalusian Association for Human Rights (APDHA), Córdoba, 2019.

- ABSTRACT: Local research carried out through surveys, focused on measuring the roots of certain discriminatory attitudes in young people, affecting ethnic minorities and people of migrant origin who live in Córdoba. Almost 400 young adults from Córdoba, aged 18 to 30, from all educational levels and city areas, participated in this study. The results point to the need for educational measures and awareness actions to prevent racism and xenophobia among young people.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Inclusion of emotional and behavioural factors.
 - Not only subjective aspects are probed, but also reactions to concrete prejudices that are common in Spanish society.
- FINDINGS:
 - Anti-discrimination policies only achieve a superficial level of awareness among young adults from Córdoba, and barely manage to establish basic principles of what is "politically correct."
 - Prejudices emerge in the daily and personal lives of young people, rather than in abstract ideas about society.
 - It is important to identify the spaces where prejudice is manifested: the internet and the streets have the greatest impact on young people.
- Research on discriminatory attitudes among young people from Córdoba (Spanish).

**Backgrounds,
experiences and
responses to hate
speech on the internet.
A comparative cross-
country analysis.**

PRISM (Preventing, Redressing and Inhibiting Hate Speech in New Media). ARCI, Carta di Roma, Universitat de Barcelona, SOS Racismo, Ligue de l'Enseignement, ROTA, FDP, CNR, UNICRI, Cittalia. 2014-2016.

- ABSTRACT: A comparative analysis of research carried out in five European countries (France, Italy, Romania, Spain and the UK), within the framework of the PRISM project. The PRISM research is primarily qualitative, based on 149 face-to-face interviews with professionals and young social media users, as well as on a mapping of the social media use of selected xenophobic and far right groups. The focus of the project is xenophobic and racist hate speech on the Internet, with an emphasis on social media, whilst also taking into account other arenas of online interaction, such as the comments sections of digital newspapers and general discussion forums. Furthermore, the qualitative part of the study places a special focus on the experiences of young social media users, as those having fully integrated social media into their day-to-day life, and with the potential to make a change. The report was elaborated by the Universitat de Barcelona. It contains an Online hate speech in Spain Fieldwork report that identifies target groups of xenophobic/racist hate speech, groups of perpetrators, country-specific web channels, and Institutions and monitoring agencies dealing with hate crimes and hate speech. For the purpose of this research five professionals and 17 young users of social media aged 20 to 31 were interviewed, including 11 men and 6 women from different ethnic and educational backgrounds.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Qualitative and comparative.
 - Mapping of xenophobic groups' use of social media.
 - Focus towards the future. Recommendations made by young social media users.
- FINDINGS:
 - Recent increase in Islamophobia and aporophobia in Spain.
 - The comments section of digital newspapers as a problematic area where hate speech tends to flourish.
 - Massive underreporting of hate speech.
 - Set of recommendations for preventing, redressing and inhibiting hate speech, in a way that will inform future policies
 - Education and awareness-raising are the leading protective factors against online hate speech.

- The complexity of hate speech calls for joint actions and multi-agency approaches.
- Backgrounds, experiences and responses to hate speech on the internet. (Direct download, English).

b) Resources

Rumour-quashing games: anti-rumour activity handbook for young people (Handbook).

Bilbao City Council, Bilbao. Area of Cooperation, Coexistence and Festivities, 2017.

- ABSTRACT: The handbook is located within the framework of the Anti-Rumour Strategy of the Bilbao City Council and contains anti-rumour dynamics and tools to work with young people in the region. It aims to provide a specific response required by professional teams (educators, teachers, tutors, etc.) who intervene with young people, to be able to develop anti-rumour actions and dynamics autonomously, in different work and socialization spaces. The manual includes a series of basic concepts around the strategy, and a selection of practical tools to work with groups of young people. The following skills are worked on through the dynamics: personal and context awareness, assertive communication, and strategies for managing group pressure, sincere listening, critical thinking, positive conflict regulation and strategies for personal change. The manual serves as a basis for intervention around awareness and the fight against discrimination among young people in the Municipality of Bilbao, through its implementation in schools and youth centres. Since its publication, a total of 2,181 students, mainly from secondary schools, have participated in the development of these dynamics.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Professional teams of educators from centres located within the Bilbao City Council participated in the design process.
 - Linking the tool to the Anti-Rumour Strategy, a strategic project of the Bilbao City Council and part of the Municipal Plan for Citizenship and Diversity.
 - Clarity, visibility and simplicity.
 - The dynamics can be easily adapted to the different realities which schools and youth centres are faced with. Focus on self-management.

- Capacity to generate surprise and subsequent reflection.
- FINDINGS:
 - Availability of a methodical resource with proposals to address contents in the field of awareness and prevention of discrimination.
 - Experiencing the process prior to the creation of prejudices and its influences on reasoning, emotions and actions.
- Games to Quash Rumours (Spanish).
- Bilbao City Council Plan for Citizenship and Diversity (II).

Awareness program for equal opportunities and intercultural coexistence in the educational field (Aula Intercultural).

FESP UGT, Spain, since 2000.

- ABSTRACT: a pioneering project which brings together different agents in the educational community to reflect upon the intercultural needs of the classroom. The objective is to provide resources and means for teachers to face the challenges of cultural, religious, ethnic, racial and other types of diversity. The program includes intervention actions (awareness campaigns aimed at students, training for the educational community, innovation projects with educational centres, competitions) in the 17 autonomous regions and the 2 autonomous cities of Spain. The program also includes online action (webpages, networks and teaching resources) for the educational community. Throughout the last 20 years, the program has guided teaching and non-teaching staff, as well as students and their families, by providing quality research, teacher training and resources, workshops for students, and awareness campaigns, in order to face the social challenges related to intercultural coexistence and the prevention of racism.
- Key Success Factors:
 - As a trade union, FESP UGT has direct contact with teachers, thus they are provided with information for diagnosis, allowing them to detect specific needs.
 - This structure is present throughout the country and has a wide community of alliances in the field of education.
 - Accumulated experience.

- Innovation: a multidisciplinary and intergovernmental team.
- The actions are proposed based on the needs that are detected in the classroom. Direct contact with the educational community.
- FINDINGS:
 - Early detection of needs and openness to change.
 - Alliances: it is essential to create bridges of knowledge and spaces for exchange.
 - Timing and processes: changes are the result of processes. The importance of constant work and perspective.
 - It is fundamental to attend to each context and to balance between what is urgent and what is important: just as we work with a long-term view, educational centres have urgencies that must be responded to in the short and medium term.
- Aula Intercultural (Spanish).

#BCNvsODI.

Barcelona City Council,
Barcelona, since 2017.

- ABSTRACT: #BCNvsOdi is a meeting and learning online space which focuses on hate speech, made available to the public by the Directorate of Citizenship Rights and Diversity (Barcelona City Council), through a website. The initiative is based on the concept that hate speech is a threat to peaceful coexistence in the city and which consequently must be combated by both the public administration and by citizens. With this online space, the City Council aims to provide a platform for disseminating and raising awareness of the fight against hate speech, both online and offline, with information, materials, and educational resources, information and analysis for citizens. Based on human rights and interculturality, *Barcelona vs. Hate* stimulates awareness and citizen participation, through conferences, workshops, articles and infographics.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Production of its own visual resources with great viral potential; concern for design and content.

- It provides a simple and effective solution to the fragmentation of resources that are being generated around the problem of hate speech, making visible the work carried out by civil society, educational centres, and public administrations.
 - Interviews with key agents and a compilation of good practices on the subject, make BCNvsODI the main platform for special content on hate speech in Spain.
 - Self-training resource library, which compiles the manuals and materials generated from various international initiatives.
- FINDINGS:
- Generation of shared knowledge from a common cause perspective, optimising the scope of available resources.
 - The structure of the initiative favours its expansion and replicability. BCNvsODI has already been replicated by Valencia City Council and any local government is invited to do so as well.
 - Collaboration with the media (M for Migrations) is an effective tool for making the experience and knowledge of key actors in the fight against hate visible, and for including their perspectives in the public debate.
- #BCNvsODI (Catalan, Spanish).

Support Manual for the prevention and detection of racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance in schools (FRIDA Project).

Spanish Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia -OBERAXE- of the General Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration, Ministry of Employment and Social Security, Spain, 2018.

- ABSTRACT: The manual was the result of Project FRIDA (Training for the Prevention and Detection of Racism, Xenophobia and Other Forms of Intolerance in Schools). The objective was to raise awareness and provide tools for teachers and educational leaders to prevent, detect and act upon incidents of racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance. In line with the project objective, the manual attempts to describe why racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance exist in Spanish society, and therefore in schools; what the diagnosis is of the situation regarding migrants and other minorities in Spain, and the regulatory framework; what strategies are available for managing diversity in schools, improving coexistence and encouraging the involvement of the educational community; what the signs are for detecting the occurrence or possible racist or xenophobic incidents or other types of intolerance or even discriminatory harassment in schools; and what the effects of these incidents are and how to act in case they occur. The manual also includes a set of good practices presented by some Autonomous Regions and organisations in the two FRIDA seminars and is accessible in Spanish, Catalan, Galician, Basque and English.
- Key Success Factors:
 - The FRIDA project was the platform for reaching more than 170 training and coexistence managers, from the Departments of Education and Regional Delegations of the Autonomous Regions and Cities.
 - The manual deals with conflicts that are difficult for teachers to handle, contemplating in a practical way how the response should be when a conflict is occurring, with the victim, the students and the assailant.
 - Clarity, visuality and simplicity.
- FINDINGS:
 - The manual provides an overview of the experiences being developed by organisations, administrations and educational centres to address racism in the classroom. Shared knowledge that did not exist before.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It provides teachers with resources to recognize and address xenophobic radicalization, a problem that had been neglected in previous years, in order to focus on prevention actions for religious extremism. • FRIDA Project (Spanish, Catalan, Galician, Basque and English).
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c) Community-building

Autobarrios San Cristóbal. Basurama. San Cristóbal de Los Ángeles, Madrid 2012-2014.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ABSTRACT: Autobarrios is a program designed to activate neighbourhoods and to help consolidate existing processes and trigger new ones through the recovery of abandoned or disused spaces, using art and culture as tools and levers of change. Citizens, especially young people, are the main actors, while associations, technicians and other neighbourhood agents, channel and design the processes. Autobarrios San Cristóbal was launched in January 2012, in Madrid's San Cristóbal de los Ángeles neighbourhood. During the first twelve months, the project worked with social and neighbourhood agents, adding to existing processes and becoming the reason to consolidate them. From these meetings, a platform was born, integrated by local associations which defined a collective process for reactivating an abandoned space, reinventing its function and use, through the construction of a suggestive urban space created by and for the youth and neighbours in the area. Since then, the project has followed a natural process based on consolidating the bonds of trust between the different actors, and on connecting and strengthening the network of local resources in order to nourish, define and make the initiative possible. • Key Success Factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Applied creativity as a tool for community development. ▪ Enhancing the value of local resources. ▪ Networking and interdisciplinarity. Coordination of all the possible actors that can, from different areas, enrich and allow the good operation of the project.
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- FINDINGS:
 - The experience of living together with a shared objective of common good, generating feelings and practices of overcoming prejudices, building knowledge of the other.
 - Meeting spaces around specific activities, putting creativity into play.
 - Actions that last, with specific, visible and material results.
- Autobarrios (Spanish, English).

**Community Action ICI,
Old Town Delicias.**

Federico Ozanam
Foundation, Zaragoza
City Council and Obra
Social "la Caixa"
Zaragoza, since 2010.

- ABSTRACT: The Intercultural Community Intervention Project (ICI Project) encourages social interaction and harmony to build a more cohesive and united society in the historic centre and Delicias district of Zaragoza; areas with great cultural diversity. To achieve this, ICI promotes a new way of working, based on local government and applied across all social areas and sectors, using the resources available in the area and involving the whole community:
 - Working through education and community health.
 - Promoting processes that foster local development and improve the living conditions of the whole population.
 - Ensuring the whole of society can take advantage of opportunities and overcome the challenge and problems inherent in new situations.
 - Preventing and reversing situations of social conflict in favour of intercultural harmony among citizens.

Action is primarily carried out via the three basic pillars of any community: Education, Health and Citizen relations. Actions in these three areas emphasize the work required with children, young people and families. Initiatives such as La Carrera del Gancho, the Delicias Community Garden, the community and artistic initiative "Delicias es más" or the Zaragoza Social Circus School, are examples of community work to build community from youth participation.

- Key Success Factors:
 - Sustainability, transforming vision of reality.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Involves private sector, public administration, social organisations and citizens. The partnership enriches an innovative model of intervention. ▪ Enhancing the value of local resources. ▪ Networking and interdisciplinarity. ▪ Creation of new spaces for neighbourhood coexistence, previously spaces of tension or hostility. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FINDINGS: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Neighbourhoods are the key spaces for working on the positive management of diversity. ▪ Generation of a model of intercultural community intervention shared with other territories, favouring the creation of an innovative and sustainable social practice in the management of cultural diversity. ▪ Application of youth talents in an ecosystem that promotes relationship spaces that strengthen co-existence, social cohesion and interculturality. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ozanam Foundation (Spanish).
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<p>Basket Beat: The socio-educational Project.</p> <p>BASKET BEAT: movement, art, education and social action. Catalonia and abroad, since 2009.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ABSTRACT: Basket Beat is an entity, a project and a methodology that supports people, especially those with fewer opportunities, in their personal growth through the creation and learning of music in groups and with basketballs. Firstly, the aim is to promote critical thinking and personal encounters. Secondly, to question the institutions within the system that also shape and constitute social problems. Every week, around 30 socio-educational workshops are held with over 600 people in high schools, prisons or public areas. In the Basket Beat workshops, participants are confronted with their own behaviours and the effect they have on others in order to learn things that are important to their lives. The objectives of the initiative include: generating new forms of relationships, improving coexistence and promoting the interconnection between formal, non-formal and informal educational spaces, promoting multiple intelligences and training in life skills such as critical thinking, communication, shared responsibility and autonomy.
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- Key Success Factors:
 - Creation of a methodology based on more than 10 years of experience in the sector, recorded in the book: "Las artes comunitarias desde la educación social. La experiencia Basket Beat" (Neret Edicions, 2017).
 - Across-the-board project that is structured into three areas. A socio-educational project, a training and research area, and an artistic area, based on an orchestra that mixes young people who have participated in Basket Beat processes with experienced musicians.
 - A project with a high impact on the media and a self-funding model.
 - Social education is the framework of reference for educational and artistic work.
 - Defined political position: all educational action should have a clear positioning around concepts such as culture, social issues or education.
- FINDINGS:
 - Decoding learning and abuse of power.
 - Basket Beat promotes group work. Participants learn about group management, the participant's role in the group and the discovery of the other.
 - Ability to generate questions around models and abuses of dominant power, discovery of critical capacity.
- Basket Beat (Catalan, Spanish).

d) Education

STAR (Stand Together Against Racism).

Cazalla Intercultural, Pro European Network, REDU, Szansa. Lorca, Murcia, 2017-2020.

- ABSTRACT: A three-year collaboration with four partners from Spain, Italy, Bulgaria and Poland, with the aim to counter invisible racism and other behaviours of intolerance in the everyday lives of young people, including online practices, through preventive measures, youth work and non-formal education. STAR is divided into three work packages. The first consists of sharing,

evaluating and adapting the practices. In the second work package, the practices are tested by the implementation of training of trainers, workshops at schools, community meetings and summer camps. Finally, in order to ensure the dissemination and sustainability of the project, the collaborators developed a best practices manual, created a MOOC (Massive Online Open Course), and offered a mixture of local, national and international events – training and conferences to convey information to key actors in the field. The plan was to achieve systematic change by taking on board policy makers, having as associated partners 24 key stakeholders from local and regional authorities, schools and grass roots organisations, which were all actively involved in the project phases.

- Key Success Factors:

- The project upscales previous best practices (Lorca Libre by Cazalla Intercultural on invisible racism; and No Hate Speech on line by Szansa) and tests their effectiveness with young people.
- It combines activities in educational centres with activities outside the schools, focused on leisure and free time (summer camps, etc.)
- Creates a space for trust and mutual learning among young people.
- Policy recommendations.
- Empowerment of youth workers, youth leaders, teachers, local policy makers in implementing the activities developed by the project in their daily work with youngsters.

- FINDINGS:

- Introduces young people's experience, understanding and perception of racism, invisible racism and other related phenomena.
- Implementation of non-formal education strategies at multiple complementary levels.
- New innovative approaches on how to work with young people (invisible racism, micro activism, etc.) and the research on real needs of youngsters in Europe nowadays.

- Star Project (English).

Kif, comics for inclusion.

Fundación Al Fanar.
Madrid, País Vasco,
Cataluña, Murcia, Galicia
since 2016.

- ABSTRACT: Nowadays, the image of the Arab and Muslim collective is mainly linked to violent and retrograde issues. People who are recognized as such are increasingly suffering racism and Islamophobia, which is particularly worrying among young people. In order to dismantle this trend, the "Kif-kif: comics for inclusion" initiative aims to contribute to the understanding of more socially and culturally diverse societies, relying on the education of adolescents, who are key drivers of development and change, and who do not always find the opportunity to participate in the construction of inclusive environments that respect diversity. "Kif-kif: Comics for Inclusion" is a social intervention project with young people, which works to raise their awareness in order to dismantle prejudices linked to cultural diversity and Islam. Its main objective is to promote, through comics and games, interculturality and the inclusion of young Muslims in their closest environment, extending intercultural and conflict resolution skills to the whole class. The comic book *Las Afueras* (The Outskirts), the result of an initiative carried out by the students of the Maria Aurèlia Capmany Secondary School in Cornellà de Llobregat, is the axis of the workshops in which concepts such as the plurality of identities or the resolution of conflicts and values such as gender equality are worked on. At the end of the six workshops, the "Multiplying workshop" is launched, which reinforces the impact of the initiative on the whole centre.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Transversality of values: gender equality, respect for religious freedom, anti-racism, respect for sexual freedom.
 - Digital comics: an innovative, agile format that is close to young people. Immediacy of visual narratives in expressing conflicts, overcoming them.
 - Deconstruction of the fear of the other and of the monolithic vision of the individual.
 - Sustainability of the impact in the intervention centres: training of the teaching staff is carried out before the implementation of the workshops. At the end of the project, a "conflict resolution cell" will have been formed in the centre, which includes both the teachers involved in the initiative and the students who benefit from it.

- FINDINGS:
 - Workshops open the debate on topics that are often considered taboo and are not addressed in the classroom because teachers often do not know how to deal with them.
 - The confidence of young Muslims is strengthened during the sessions by valuing diversity and encouraging their visibility so that peers may value their culture and empathise with them, after identifying the difficulties they experience in their school and family environments.
 - The “multiplying workshop”, in which the students who have attended the workshops take the leading role by carrying the weight of an awareness-raising capsule session that they give to their classmates in lower grades, allows for a greater impact of the initiative, as well as reinforcing the concepts worked on.
- Las Afueras.
- Kif (Spanish).

The Box. Initiative to break social prejudices from Sustainable Development Goals.

Jovesolides. Comunidad Valenciana, since 2016.

- ABSTRACT: An education for development project that brings children and young people from schools in the Valencian Community closer to other realities which consider the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Box encourages the breaking down of barriers that limit our vision, addressing inclusive education, gender equality, environmental degradation and responsible consumption, and inclusive societies since the arrival of refugees in Europe. To do so, it uses an innovative methodology created by Jovesolides, *the Creative Solution to Social Problems*, as well as creative dynamics and life experiences that help young people break down prejudices. This allows them to look outside their box and acquire a different and more active role in society, with greater openness and respect for difference.
- Key Success Factors:
 - It strengthens the role of children as generators of ideas to transform the world, initiating a transmission belt of social change that impacts their environments.

- Use of experiential formats that encourage empathy through personal encounters and testimonies.
 - It is introduced especially in those classrooms where a higher level of discrimination and prejudice has been detected as a tool to combat them.
 - Use of own methodology that stimulates the generation of innovative proposals that are later transferred to educational centres, councils, etc.
- FINDINGS:
 - A formula that takes universal issues to the individual level, with a focus on the common good: identifying with the SDGs and proposing ideas from local to global stages.
 - As opposed to the conception that children are the future, this project affirms and defends children as the present, as citizens who play an important role in society and who have the capacity to transform it.
 - The impact of the experiential. Children's direct knowledge of the realities of migrants and refugees has a positive impact on the construction of their opinion and critical awareness.
- Jovesolides (Spanish).

Somos Más.

Google, Government of Spain, Red AWARE, UGT, and Jóvenes y Desarrollo Foundation. Spain, since 2018.

- ABSTRACT: #SomosMás is an initiative for respect and diversity, with the aim of promoting the active commitment of young people in the elimination of violent radicalisation and hate speech. It represents a broad social movement against these types of manifestations. The project has two main areas of work: training workshops aimed at more than 28,000 boys and girls in schools and centres throughout the country, which include the development of educational resources and role-playing games to facilitate understanding by students, parents and teachers; and awareness raising: a communication campaign that includes, among other things, collaborations with creators and influencers who help amplify positive messages through their videos. The campaign targets mainly young people between 14 and 20 years of age, across the country. In addition, the project's website makes a wide variety of materials available to the public in order to also reach parents, schools and other important actors in the field of education.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Alliance between internet platforms, NGOs and public institutions; shared responsibility.
 - Participation of young role models, specifically youtubers who reflect the diversity of society and who are ambassadors of a constructive and respectful use of social networks.
 - Training and awareness through action, introducing challenges and audiovisual competitions to encourage participation.
- FINDINGS:
 - Union of two essential areas: classroom education and the use of the Internet to amplify respect, tolerance and diversity.
 - Promotion of a positive approach – technology for common good – as opposed to perspectives focused on the dangers of social networks.
- Somos Más: www.somos-mas.es (Spanish).

e) Communication/Awareness raising

EpDLab. Education for Development Laboratory.

AGARESO (Galician Association of Communication for Social Change). Galicia and Central America, since 2015.

- ABSTRACT: EpdLab is an education-communication project that aims to promote social awareness of the causes of global inequality and the role of communication as an engine for social transformation in secondary education. At the same time, it aims to improve the capacity for critical reflection and the generation of digital products by students and teachers in secondary schools in five Galician towns. The main tools to achieve this are the analysis of media and social network discourse, together with the production of counter-discourse through digital narratives. Each year, the project is carried out in five different secondary education schools in Galicia, and one of the activities is implemented in an education centre in Central America. All the Galician towns where the activity takes place have less than 25,000 inhabitants and represent the social and geographic diversity in Galicia. Around 125 students participate in the project every year, and around 25 teachers, half of whom participate in the whole process and the rest in specific training to transfer the knowledge acquired from the "Digital Narratives for Social Change".
- Key Success Factors:
 - Motivation: tools and themes connect with students.
 - Peer learning: promoting dialogue, group work and participatory learning.
 - Creativity: developing digital content with a social perspective.
 - Critical thinking: throughout the course, media literacy improves.
 - Replicability: all sessions are public with a CC license which allows for reuse.
- FINDINGS:
 - Use of technology for the common good: the products created include memes, dubs, videos, counter-advertising, animation, etc.
 - High replicability through free access materials: a didactic guide is available for teachers who want to replicate the project in other schools.
- EpD Lab (Galician, Spanish).

cibeRespect.

Ecos do Sur in partnership with IDHC, SOS Racisme, United Explanations. Galicia and Madrid, since 2016.

- ABSTRACT: a collaborative project based on the creation of support networks, monitoring of xenophobic speech on the internet and cyber activism as a strategy to combat hate speech and hate crimes against migrants and ethnic minorities. CibeRespect strengthens young people through positive actions, addressing issues such as disinformation, prejudices and hate, so they can feed the digital landscape with respect that reverberates in our neighbourhoods. CibeRespect promotes the shared knowledge and the development of tools to ignite critical thinking and break the spiral of silence from the tolerant sector. To this end, it fosters local action and community relations in the global digital environment, inspiring, motivating, training and accompanying the birth of a new social actor: the cyberactivist called to lead a new narrative about our diverse society.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Addressing the growing problem of misinformation and cyberhate.
 - Collective construction of counter-narratives, actions and models of digital intervention.
 - Wide range of audiences and beneficiaries, with a focus on training immigrants, young people and communicators as agents of change.
 - Replicability and sustainability.
 - Articulation of physical and digital action.
 - Introduction of practices for detecting and combating cyberharassment in the entities' hosting processes.
 - Popular school: leading training with experts available to people in exclusion, students, etc.
- FINDINGS:
 - Development of gamification techniques, theory of mental frameworks and game theory applied to the digitalisation and spreading of narratives.
 - Potential of Service-Learning actions in collaboration with schools and universities, generating heterogeneous groups.
 - Awareness of the 'relational culture of hate' and of the discursive violence that is being generated in social networks, and development of skills for the

	<p>substitution of this culture for another communicative style in our daily relations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Step towards protagonist action, discursive leadership by people who are usually separated from participation and leadership. ▪ Generation of horizontal and collaborative relationships, where everyone is heard as an equal (teachers/students, adults/children, etc.) promoting an empathetic, supportive and proactive position in the face of discrimination. • CibeRespect (Spanish).
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Gypsy Lesson.

Fundación Secretariado Gitano, Spain, 2018.

- ABSTRACT: Gypsy Lesson is an awareness campaign launched at state level in 2018, and then disseminated across different Spanish cities. Its objective is to provide knowledge on the Roma population in Spanish society, offering brushstrokes of history, culture and, above all, showing the progress and a real image of the Roma population today. It aims to combat ignorance and thus fight against discrimination and daily rejection. The campaign is financed by the program "For Solidarity. Other purposes of social interest" offered by the Ministry of Health, Consumption and Social Welfare, and by the European Social Fund. The creative idea behind the campaign is based on taking "Gypsy Lessons", that is, discovering the history we have never been told about the Gypsy people; the names of people who have historically been invisible; the news that was never published. To spread this necessary Gypsy Lesson, the campaign has different materials and actions: books, videos, social media actions, an online game, master classes, etc.
- Key Success Factors:
 - It generates knowledge and a new narrative about the Gypsy people and their history, which is unknown to most Spaniards.
 - It transfers the generated knowledge to libraries and educational centres, extracting it from folklore and putting it in its rightful place: hand national culture.
 - Innovative materials focused on different audiences: journalists, young people, etc.

- FINDINGS:
 - Identification of the historical and cultural baggage of the Roma people with the heritage of society as a whole, breaking the dichotomy of us/them and emphasising the progress made.
 - Power of symbolic acts, such as the delivery of the book “Lección Gitana” to the National Library of Spain and to educational centres throughout the country.
 - The wisdom of basing an awareness campaign on a previous survey which reflects the existing ignorance and prejudices regarding the history of the Romani population.
- Lección Gitana. (Spanish).

**Change the Story
(Cambia el Cuento).**

CEAR and Sic4Change,
Canary Islands, since
2019.

- ABSTRACT: #ChangeTheStory is a process promoted by CEAR Canarias and Sic4Change to promote a different vision of migration through a process of co-creation of messages and communication campaigns that promote a change in migration narratives. To this end, communication professionals from the third sector and public administrations work in a guided process to deconstruct migration narratives, understand the frames of reference and build messages that are later launched on social media with the support of technology. #ChangeTheStory employs the Migration methodology, generated by the Por Causa Foundation. One-day meetings to create and launch communication campaigns that help transform migration narratives, making use of marketing, design, audiovisual and software tools to produce memes, comics, software and animation that generate a massive impact on society.
- Key Success Factors:
 - Design of alternative visions that lead to diverse communication campaigns, but with unified messages.
 - Focus on communicators, migrants and students.
 - Participants have access to innovative tools for content creation.

- FINDINGS:
 - Individual and collective learning in different areas. The process is based on methodologies of co-creation and construction of collective intelligence based on three pillars: mutual knowledge and creation of links between organisations; theoretical training; and collective work for the realisation of common or individual actions that launch a strong message to change the negative narratives on migration.
 - Importance of transmitting the new narratives to sectors of society which have been traditionally forgotten in awareness actions.
 - Collective creation of a positive frame of reference, concrete ideas for effective communication campaigns, clear messages and specific actions.
- Cambia el Cuento (Change the Story) (Spanish).

f) Networking generation

Raise the Tone Against Racism Network.

Valencia City Council, Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia, Moviment per la Pau, València Acull, La Casa Grande and Jarit. Valencia, since 2014.

- ABSTRACT: The aim of the project is to prevent racist, xenophobic and intolerant behaviour by promoting civic values of coexistence and tolerance, as well as providing teachers with tools for the prevention of violent attitudes derived from racist and xenophobic views. This initiative aims to involve the city's secondary schools so that they actively collaborate in the development of network objectives, in the adaptation and transformation of the dynamics of prevention activities, in the analysis of needs, and in detecting cases that may require individual attention. This is a network initiative that includes actions and measures to work preventively on racist and xenophobic attitudes in the school environment. It includes a catalogue of proposals adapted to the characteristics of the schools, a support platform against racism and xenophobia, and training students as agents of coexistence. There are currently more than 23 schools in the city that are members of the Raise the Tone Against Racism Network.

- Key Success Factors:
 - Generation of a sustainable structure that progressively incorporates different sectors of the population.
 - Stimulation of creativity through art contests (audiovisual, music, literature), through which young people produce awareness-raising materials.
 - It provides tools for teachers and involves schools in the development of new didactic materials to raise awareness.
 - Commitment of the educational centres included in the Coexistence Plan.
- FINDINGS:
 - Development of methodologies to promote mutual support and cooperative relationships between schools in the network.
 - Promotion of individual responsibility for the common good: students volunteer to be agents of coexistence and observation against racism.
 - Potential for self-expression, affirmative action and emotions: human libraries, arts against racism.
- Valencia City Council (Spanish, Valencian).

Stop Rumores.

Andalucía Acoge Federation. Andalucía, Ceuta and Melilla, since 2014.

- ABSTRACT: strategy of communicative and social impact that aims to fight, in a sustained manner over time, against rumours and negative stereotypes that hinder coexistence and diversity. With the aim of adding synergies, complementing actions and joining efforts, the Andalucía Acoge Federation welcomes, invites, and promotes the collaborative efforts from the Stop Rumours Agency, associations, entities, organisations and individuals who generate synergies to fight against rumours. There are currently more than 130 member entities, including social organisations, public administrations and private companies. The project generates networking, through the training and involvement of Anti-Rumour Agents who adopt an active attitude, combating rumours and stereotypes in their local and nearby environments. They are the backbone of this strategy developed in neighbourhoods, towns and

cities, presenting objective and supported information against false claims, and detecting the emergence of new rumours to fight against.

- Key Success Factors:
 - Great impact in the digital field, combined with detailed implementation in the territory, through the continuous training of new anti-rumour agents.
 - The training approach, which combines the emotional side of rumours with effective communication tools.
 - Adaptation of information from official sources, with language and images that are meaningful to people.
- FINDINGS:
 - Resistance to change in people and organisations is very strong and demands that the project be transformed into a process, which is addressed by Rumour Free Spaces.
 - Takes the opportunity of shared festivities and key dates to spread messages using humour and new digital narratives (GIFs, memes).
 - Takes advantage of the possibilities of interaction offered by digital environments in order to encourage citizen participation in the detection and quashing of rumours.
- Stop Rumores (Spanish)

→ estudios

Right-wing extremism among the youth in Spain: current situation and perspectives

In the last decade, right-wing extremism has increased in Europe and in Spain. On the one hand, the rise of far-right anti-immigration movements and parties in other European countries has provided international allies and information resources that help nation-based far-right movements to expand. On the other, the general disinformation environment in traditional and social media is helping these movements to convey their message, contributing to the dissemination of hate-based fake news and hate speech.

This research study aims to analyse how the current changing context is affecting Spanish youngsters' attitudes and speech, and to what extent they find extreme right-wing ideas and discourses – such as hate speech – attractive. In particular, it attempts to examine whether youngsters are well equipped to resist radicalization in a context characterized by disinformation. Finally, it proposes some recommendations aimed at public authorities and civil society organisations in order to prevent right-wing radicalization among youngsters.



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